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# XXVII

## BULGARIA AND YUGOSLAVIA

DWIGHT E. LEE

### *Introduction*

B-Y 727 ● 648 BULGARIA and Yugoslavia emerged from the war of 1914-1918 in contrasting positions—the one a defeated power and the other a victor. This situation, a repetition of that following the Second Balkan War only six years before, helped to perpetuate a feeling of rivalry and bitterness toward each other. Both nations, however, faced serious political and economic problems at home which were far from satisfactorily settled when the war of 1939-1945 caught them up again and threw them once more on opposite sides of the struggle.

### *Bulgaria*[1]

B 727 643 668 The military collapse of Bulgaria in September, 1918, was followed shortly afterward on October 4 by the abdication of Tsar Ferdinand and the succession of Boris III. Although the pro-German premier, Radoslavov, had resigned some months before, his successors who signed the armistice were unable to stem the current of discontent and disillusionment caused by wartime suffering and the prospect of a severe peace. Accordingly, in the elections of August, 1919, the leftist Agrarian party won a significant victory under the leadership of Alexander Stambolisky who had gone to jail for three years because of his opposition to entry into the war and, upon his release in 1918, had sought to set up a republic. Of peasant stock, he was the embodiment of the hopes for a new era held by the Bulgarian farmers who constituted nearly 80 per cent of the population. After 000

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[1] The best studies on contemporary Bulgaria are the following: A. Bulatsel, *Ocherki sotsialno-politicheskoi zhizni Bolgarii* (Moscow, 1925); K. Dimitriev, *Bolgariya* (Moscow, [illegible]41); A. Girginov, *Ot voinata kŭm mir* (Sofia, 1937); T. Girginov, *Istoricheski razvoi na sŭvremenna Bŭlgariya* (2 v.; Sofia, 1934-1935); N. Iliev, *Boris III, tsar na Bŭlgaritě* (Sofia, [illegible]36); A. P. Malinov, *Stranichki ot nashata nova politicheska istoriya* (Sofia, 1938); N. D. [illegible]kov, *Aleksandŭr Stamboliĭski. Lichnost i idei* (Sofia, 1930); N. Stanev, *Istoriya na nova Bŭlgariya, 1878-1928* (Sofia, 1929); K. Todorov, *Politička istorija savremene Bugarske* (Belgrad, 1938). Sources in Slavic languages have been supplied by Professor C. E. Black of Princeton University.

After
becoming premier in October, 1919, Stambolisky's first task was that of 728
signing the peace terms drawn up by the victorious Allies.

The Treaty of Neuilly, November 27, 1919, reduced Bulgaria to a [131]
smaller area than it had held before the First Balkan War of 1912 and imposed
new burdens. Bulgaria lost the Aegean coast (Western Thrace) to
Greece, southern Dobruja to Romania, and strips of land on the west to
Yugoslavia. The army was limited to a total of 20,000. Reparations [701]
amounting to $450,000,000 were to be paid in thirty-seven years, beginning
in 1921. The existence of Bulgarian minorities in all the neighboring [668]
states furnished a basis for revisionism which steadily grew, particularly
after the rise of fascism throughout Europe in the thirties.[2] The [167]
provision for an exchange of populations with Greece greatly heightened
the volume of refugees who streamed into Bulgaria, adding to the political
ferment and economic burdens of the country. In these and other ways,
the settlement exacerbated conditions under which radicalism throve.

Stambolisky won a commanding position in the parliamentary elections 643
of March, 1920, and proceeded to ride roughshod over both the middle 185
class and conservative parties on the right and the Communists on the left.
He instituted a number of reforms, including a land law designed to break 656
up the crown lands and larger estates, the imposition of a heavy income 648 ●
tax, and the establishment of a compulsory labor service which in the first
four years of operation secured the equivalent of five million wage days 669
of work for the Ministries of Public Works and Railways. In foreign policy
he sought to fulfill the treaties and to effect a reconciliation with Yugoslavia
among whose Communist and Agrarian parties his concepts of
Slavic federation found support. His dictatorial methods, however, won
him enemies on all sides, not least among them being the Macedonians
who opposed his policy of rapprochement with Yugoslavia. In June, 1923,
he was overthrown by a *coup d'état* organized by a group of intellectuals,
led by Professor Tsankov, and the League of Army Reserve Officers,
among whom Colonels Velchev and Georgiev were leaders. A few days
later Stambolisky was assassinated.

Following the Stambolisky regime, the Tsankov government (1923-26) 642
represented a swing to the right. "Communist" insurrections and violence 668
were suppressed with great severity. The increased activity of the Internal
Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) caused difficulties at
home and abroad, although after the assassination of its leader Alexandrov
(1924) it was split into two factions under Protoguerov and Mihailov who
became bitter rivals. A threat of war with Greece arose, but was averted
by the action of the League of Nations. A more conciliatory government

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[2] See G. P. Genov, *Bulgaria and the Treaty of Neuilly* (Sofia, 1935).

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eventually held in March, 1938, under a changed electoral law which permitted 646
married women to vote but forbade candidates to run as members 666
of the old political parties. In May, 1938, the *sobranie* met for the first time
since 1935, but found itself reduced to the position of a consulting body.

The political crises of the period after 1933 were but outward expressions 648
of the serious economic condition in which Bulgaria, along with all other
predominantly agrarian countries of eastern Europe, had found itself as a
result of the world-wide economic depression. At the same time both Italy
and Germany sought to bring Bulgaria into their political and economic
orbits. Bulgaria for several years seemed to waver between them and their
rivals in power politics. Although its refusal to join the Balkan Entente,
because of its revisionist territorial claims, seemed to align Bulgaria with
Italy, a tense situation was avoided by the signature of a Pact of Friendship
with Yugoslavia on January 24, 1937. In 1938 when the east European
atmosphere had become clouded because of Germany's annexation of Austria
and the developing Munich crisis, Bulgaria gained recognition of the
right to rearm by means of an agreement in July with Greece who acted
on behalf of the Balkan Entente. This was followed by an Anglo-French
loan amounting to ten million dollars to assist in Bulgarian rearmament,
although Germany had already supplied much material toward this end.
Nevertheless, Germany had two advantages over its rivals. One was its
freedom to encourage Bulgarian revisionist ambitions which, after the
Bulgar-Yugoslav pact, tended to create greatest tension with Romania over
the Dobruja. The other was the powerful economic tie developed between
the two countries by means of trade agreements. After Austria and [439]
part of Czechoslovakia had been incorporated in the Nazi Reich in 1939
about 52 per cent of Bulgaria's exports went to Germany and about 63 per
cent of its imports came from there.

It is doubtful, however, if the developing ties with Germany influenced 648
the feelings of the Bulgarian people. Tsar Boris and his governments, 186
even though they sanctioned agreements by which the political police cooperated
with the Gestapo in pursuing "Communists," sought to keep 665
down native fascism. There was, moreover, very little antisemitism in
Bulgaria. The political opposition composed of the former Agrarian, Liberal,
Radical, Socialist, and Democratic party elements, was by its nature
antagonistic to Nazism. And, finally, the people had always retained a
deepseated feeling of sympathy and respect for Russia against whom the
Nazis were ostensibly aligned. Indeed, right down to 1941 there was much
ground for believing that Bulgaria might well maintain neutrality in the
second World War.

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## *The War of 1939-1945*

### *Jockeying for Position*

When the European war broke out in September, 1939, the conditions in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were not dissimilar. In each country a semi-dictatorial government, primarily responsible to the monarch, ruled with the assent of a subservient parliament. The predominantly agrarian masses were discontented with both political and economic conditions but were inarticulate and ineffectively organized. While all former political parties had been officially dissolved, their members continued to carry on a half-concealed activity beneath the eyes of the censor and the political police. The economy of each country was tied, in the main, to Germany's; although in Bulgaria, Great Britain and France made a pretense at counteracting German influences, they had apparently abandoned Yugoslavia to the Axis. In foreign relations both governments officially pursued a policy of neutrality, while their ministers and rulers made open or surreptitious visits to Hitler or his henchmen. German "tourists" ceaselessly worked in each country for the benefit of the German Reich.

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Beneath the surface, however, there were forces which caused Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to take different courses when the crucial test came. In Yugoslavia resistance to collaboration with the Axis sprang up the minute the government capitulated. In Bulgaria, on the other hand, the government was able to swing the country into the Axis camp and keep it there until the triumph of the United Nations and particularly Russia made it clear that the Axis was losing the war.

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As late as February, 1940, the Bulgarian government[5] assured the members of the Balkan Entente that it would not press its revisionist claims while the war lasted. With the dismemberment of Romania, however, in the summer of 1940, Bulgaria considered itself absolved of this pledge and in September obtained Southern Dobruja, thus regaining the boundary of 1912. Although Romania and Hungary were persuaded in November to adhere to the Tripartite Pact of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and despite the fact that over 80 per cent of Bulgaria's trade was now being carried on with Germany, the tsar and his government refused to join the Axis. Russia, whose agreement with the Reich in August, 1939, had undoubtedly helped to confuse the Bulgarian people, may have had something to do

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[5] In well-managed elections, January, 1940, the government obtained a *sobranje* composed of 140 supporters and 20 opponents of whom 9 were Communists. A new government, organized on February 16, was headed by Bogdan Filov who remained premier until he entered the Regency Council in September, 1943.

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648 with the refusal, for the Soviet plainly indicated its disapproval of a Bulgarian alliance with Germany. In January and February, 1941, however, German pressure upon Bulgaria was greatly increased as the Nazi regime prepared for the conquest of Greece, with whom Italy had been at war since the previous October. The United States and Great Britain sought to warn Bulgaria against repeating the mistake of the first World War, while the opposition within the country likewise voiced its disapproval of a pro-German policy. But German "tourists" and German propaganda gradually won the upper hand, until finally, on March 1, Premier Filov signed the Axis pact at Vienna. He had undoubtedly been offered the fulfillment of Bulgarian revisionist claims against Yugoslavia and Greece. German troops immediately poured into the country from across the Danube and German economic experts, who had already gained experience while turning Romania into a "purely primary producer," began to prepare Bulgaria for its role as a "first-class exporting country."[6]

*Yugoslavia*

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648 The adherence of Bulgaria to the Axis meant that Yugoslavia was all but surrounded by German satellites, for only on the south, where the Greeks were more than holding their own, was there a gap in the Axis system. Obviously Germany's plans for a quick conquest of Greece in preparation for an attack upon Soviet Russia required the coöperation of the Yugoslavs. Accordingly the familiar pressures were now exerted upon the Belgrad government. Although Yugoslavia's economy was not quite as dependent as Bulgaria's on the Reich, the country was in a more vulnerable geographical position. Moreover, the dissident nationalities offered a fine opportunity for Nazi propaganda, while Prince Paul and other men of the government and of leading business circles had established close contacts with the Fascist and Nazi regimes. [625] If wartime revelations are to be trusted, it would appear, for example, that beginning in 1937 Yugoslav political police entered into a working agreement with the Gestapo to help eliminate political undesirables. It is not surprising, therefore, that Premier 648 669 Cvetković and Foreign Minister Cincar-Marković were persuaded to sign the Tripartite Pact at Vienna on March 25, 1941, and at the same time agreed, apparently, to permit the passage of German troops to Greece. But here the parallel with Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria ends, for the Yugoslav people made such a prompt and unmistakable protest against

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[6] For convenient summaries of events and of Bulgarian and German aims, see "The German Threat to Bulgaria," *Bulletin of International News*, XVIII (February 22, 1941), 191-197; "German New Order Reappears," *ibid.*, XVIII (November 29, 1941), 1912-14; and "Bulgaria and the War," *ibid.*, XX (November 13 and 27, 1943), 989-94 and 1031-39.

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of Yugoslavia" (AVNOJ), established at Jayce, November, 1943. Following the Teheran decision, pressure was put upon King Peter in London to make an agreement with Tito. This was accomplished in the summer of 1944 by Ivan Subašić who had been appointed premier of the government-in-exile for that purpose. As the Germans were gradually cleared out of the country after the surrender of Italy and Bulgaria, the further step of setting up a provisional government on Yugoslav soil was taken in March, 1945, when a new regency council was appointed, Tito was made premier, and Subašić became foreign minister. Though the story of the next few months was to be scarcely less exciting than that of the war period, it belongs to the era of peacemaking and reconstruction where it will be discussed. Y 648 727

*Bulgaria*

Even though Bulgaria shared in the early triumphs of the Axis, occupying Thrace as well as most of Macedonia, its position was little better than Yugoslavia's. The Bulgarian government had to adopt a policy of severe repression, especially after 1941, in order to keep in line the mass of the population whose traditional sympathies for Russia and the United States were aroused after their entry into the war against Germany. Moreover, the Third Reich made ever increasing demands upon the country as the initial Nazi victories were turned into defeat in both Russia and the Mediterranean. Reports from Bulgaria of insurrections, sabotage, student demonstrations, Communist terrorism, and disaffected public servants including army officers were common throughout 1942 and 1943. The Nazis found it necessary not only to direct all police work but also to interfere frequently in the administration of important government departments until the German Minister, Beckerle, became virtually a *Gauleiter* in a hostile land. Apparently Boris III and his governments did their best to resist the most distasteful demands, and it may well be that the tsar met his death in August, 1943, because of his refusal to yield to Hitler's requests. Some indication of the temper of the people may be gleaned from the fact that Premier Filov arranged a pro-German Council of Regency for young Tsar Simeon II without taking the risk of seeking authorization from a specially elected *sobranje* as required by the constitution.[8] B 727 648

By late spring, 1944, reports began to appear concerning "Partisan" activity in Bulgaria and the formation of a "Fatherland Front" composed of 668 642

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[8] Very little reliable information concerning Bulgaria since 1941 has been published. For the handiest summaries of news reports, see the references cited in footnote 6 above and also the *Bulletin of International News*, XXI XXII (1944-45). Foreign newspaper correspondents were admitted to Bulgaria only in the middle of 1945.

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668 Communists, Agrarians, Democrats, and republicans. In the summer the
642 Soviet Union, against whom Bulgaria had not declared war, began to press
for the ousting of the Germans and a reversal of the policy pursued since
● 648 1941. On September 2, a new Bulgarian government, headed by a former
secretary of Stambolisky, Konstantin Muraviev, and including former
Premier Mušanov, announced the full restoration of democratic freedom
and rights, a return to neutrality, and the nullification of the Tripartite
Pact. It also dispatched representatives to Cairo to negotiate an armistice
with Great Britain and the United States and, on September 8, declared
721 war on Germany. In the meantime, however, Russia, not fully satisfied
642 with the course being pursued, declared war on Bulgaria on September 5.
This confusing situation was clarified four days later when Muraviev was
succeeded by a new government which had the full support of the "Fatherland Front." It was led by Kimon Georgiev, who was alleged to have experienced a change of heart since his participation in the *coup d'état* of 1934, and included his former colleague, Colonel Velchev.

Before the end of September Russian military forces had moved into
the country and were rapidly turning the Bulgarian army, now placed under the command of a Russian General, Tolbukhin, against the fleeing
728 Germans. By the formal armistice terms, signed in Moscow on October
28, 1944, Bulgaria promised to withdraw from all territories occupied in Greece and Yugoslavia, to restore all properties of the United Nations and make reparation for damages, to rid Bulgaria of all pro-Axis organizations, to coöperate in the arrest and trial of war criminals, and to accept an Allied Control Commission which would regulate and supervise the execution of the armistice. Since Russia held a dominant position in the Commission and since Bulgaria was prepared to follow Communist leadership, her lot as an ex-Axis satellite differed little from that of Yugoslavia.

## *Reconstruction and Peacemaking*

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669 Reconstruction in both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria took the form of a revolution led by Communists and was patterned after the policies and practices of the Soviet Union.

### *The National Front in Yugoslavia*

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642 The Tito government, established in Yugoslavia in 1945, promised that
631 it would "comply with the fundamental and general principles of constitutional government" and that it intended to found a democratic, federative state. This was to consist of Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia. Provisional governments were formed in each of these units in April and May, 1945. While Tito's ter-

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Y 648 fusing to attend the conference called at Paris to consider the Marshall Plan for European reconstruction, Yugoslavia manifested her determination to stand by Soviet Russia economically as well as politically.

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### *The Fatherland Front in Bulgaria*

642 648 665 In attempting to fulfill the terms of the armistice and to prepare for parliamentary elections, the Georgiev government in Bulgaria, like that of Tito in Yugoslavia, was accused of pursuing totalitarian tactics. The United States and Great Britain entered protests against the conduct of the elections of November, 1945, in which 88 per cent of the vote was reported to be in favor of the Fatherland Front. The effort of the two powers to bring about the admission to the government of two representatives of "other democratic groups" proved unavailing, despite the agreement of Soviet Russia to the proposal at the Moscow Conference in December. [666] The National Assembly which chose Vassil Kolarov, a Communist, to be its president, arranged for a plebiscite, September 9, 1946, on the form of government. When the results went overwhelmingly in favor of a republic, the Assembly on September 15, declared Bulgaria to be a People's Republic. Elections in October, following the drafting of a constitution, returned an Assembly less predominantly Communist than Yugoslavia's, though whether this outcome was designed or came about because of a failure to crush the opposition effectively is not clear. The Fatherland Front majority of 366 deputies was made up of 279 Communists (Workers' Party), sixty-nine dissident Agrarians, nine *Zveno* members, eight dissident Social Democrats, and one Radical; while the opposition of 99 was composed of ninety Agrarians under the leadership of Petkov, and nine Social Democrats led by Lelchev.[10] In November Georgiev resigned as premier and was succeeded by Georgi Dimitrov, an eminent Communist who had been made famous by the Reichstag Fire Trial in 1934 and had been living in Russia until the end of the war. Like Yugoslavia, Bulgaria had entered upon the path of a Soviet-orientated state.

### *Peacemaking and Foreign Relations*

Y-B 648 Beginning with the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco in 1945, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, whenever represented or discussed at international conferences, have been led or supported by Soviet Russia. Thus they are both aligned with the "Eastern"

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[10] For a brief description of the elections and the policies of the Dimitrov regime by a sympathetic observer, see Commander Edgar P. Young, "'People's Republic Bulgaria'," *Contemporary Review*, CLXXI (March, 1947), 162-66.

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side of the East-West division that seems to have split Europe and the world. Y-B 648 •

With respect to boundary settlements, Yugoslavia failed to get Trieste and an additional slice of Carinthia, although she won most of the Istrian Peninsula and much of Venezia Giulia which she had demanded. At the same time Bulgaria retained the part of southern Dobruja awarded her in 1941, but failed to get an outlet to the sea through "Aegean Macedonia" as she desired. Although both governments, along with Albania's, were guilty of permitting, if not fostering, attacks upon Greece by armed bands in support of Greek Communists and refused to coöperate fully with the United Nations investigating committee, it is not yet clear whether they hoped to wrest part of Macedonia from Greece by force or looked forward to a secession by a Communist group which would join the Yugoslav federation. 728 [721]

It is certain, however, that Bulgaria's relations with Yugoslavia were conducted in the spirit of the declaration of January 10, 1945 in favor of "the closest possible collaboration with the peoples of the new Yugoslavia." Tito more than once reciprocated this sentiment, raising the conjecture that perhaps the federal structure of Yugoslavia might be extended to embrace Bulgaria. Until August, 1947, however, collaboration took the form of an agreement, completed on August 2, upon a mutual assistance pact and full cultural and economic coöperation, described in the announcement as virtually wiping out the frontier between them. At the same time Yugoslavia made a series of agreements with Albania that integrated its economy closely with Yugoslavia's. Thus the century-old dream of Balkan Slavic leaders came close to realization by means of the binding force of Communism. In this and in many other respects Bulgaria and Yugoslavia are experiencing a revolution still at full tide. What the ultimate ebb and flow may bring still remains obscured by the uncertainties and imponderables not only within their boundaries, but perhaps even more by those in the world around them. 648

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* The author wishes to acknowledge the valuable assistance of Miss Ruth Savord, Librarian of the Council on Foreign Relations, in compiling this bibliography.

## CHAPTER X

# PRELUDE TO COMMUNISM (1937-1944)

RETURNING to Bulgaria in the fall of 1945 meant returning to a defeated, occupied enemy country. Because I had followed the political events only from a distance, I was anxious to see how native Bulgarians, and particularly my Dragalevtsy friends, would interpret what had happened during the intervening years. Overshadowing all, of course, had been their active collaboration with the Germans. 000

Germany's entrance into Bulgaria proved a comparatively easy achievement. Basic to the plan was the conviction on the part of the Bulgarian people that Germany would actually win the war and give them a safe way of profiting at their neighbors' expense. Economic penetration had come first. Gradually Germany bought more and more of Bulgaria's goods and by 1939 was taking almost seventy-five per cent of all of the country's exports. Even before I left, Bulgarian friends were deploring the anti-Semitism of the Nazis, but when I asked them why Bulgaria seemed to be receptive to German propaganda they usually replied, "But Germany is our best customer. And one always humors one's best customer." Ideological penetration accompanied the economic. The German School in Sofia was managed by ardent Nazis. The greater part of the student body was composed of loyal Bulgarian boys, but any boy of German parentage (and there was a fairly large German colony in Sofia) had to belong to the Nazi Youth organization to remain in the school. Bulgarian army officers came back from trips to Berlin ardently pro-German. A few highly placed officials acquired an opulence that made people raise their eyebrows, until these same officials acted friendly toward the Germans; then people understood. A large contingent of Bulgarians made a trip to the 1936 Olympic games held in Berlin and returned with increased admiration for German efficiency. Inept British and French diplomacy made the German success even more outstanding. 648 ●

● 648 But the Germans had fertile soil. Defeated in the second Balkan War and in the first World War, the Bulgarians were quick to grasp what seemed to be a sure thing. They had built up a chauvinism in their educational system that made the end of getting back what they considered former Bulgarian territory more important than the means chosen. As the smaller countries fell one by one, the Bulgarians began to squirm. Then came the debacle in the West illuminated only by the shining stand of Britain. The satellites, Hungary and Rumania, had fallen into line. While Hitler helped Bulgaria obtain South Dobrudja from a badly disrupted Rumania, Russia, Bulgaria's former champion, was still bound by a nonaggression pact with Germany. Over and over again the Germans showed moving pictures of their European conquests to groups of Bulgarians. Thus the idea of German invincibility took root and was in full bloom when the Nazi armies crossed the Danube to join the hundreds of German "tourists" already filling up the country's hotels and inns. Bulgaria had been duped, but this, like ignorance, afforded no justification, and certainly little comfort, in the days of Allied Victory.

The tragedy of Greece and Yugoslavia, to which Bulgaria was a party, made plain to all what the "New Order" actually meant, as if Poland and Norway were not evidence enough. Bulgaria took over the job of policing some of these occupied territories and officially annexed part of them to the Greater Bulgaria. Millions of leva went into the building of highways, railways, school buildings, and land reclamation projects in these new territories, and enthusiastic attempts were launched to make "good Bulgarians" out of all of the newly acquired citizenry.

Bulgarians traveled in great number through Skoplje and Ochrid of Eastern Macedonia in order to see these places which one-sided history and geography books frequently said should belong to Bulgaria. Then clouds, black for the Bulgarian nationalist, began to appear on the horizon: Stalingrad, El Alamein, Italy. As the Allied might grew, the Bulgarians became restless; as they became restless, the secret police became more active, and the handshake of their German ally proved to have the strength of steel, at least for a while.

Anglo-American bombings of Sofia and of strategic railway yards helped pave the way for eventual Russian occupation on the heels of German evacuation. September, 1944, saw the arrival of the Red Army and the beginning of a new phase of Bulgaria's history, to be described in the following chapter. 648

All of these facts were running through my mind when, with a feeling of genuine excitement, I went to Dragalevtsy one mild November morning in 1945. I had little idea of what my investigation would uncover. The village had a tidiness I had not remembered, a tidiness noticeable despite the mud from the previous day's rain which, as I sought firm earth on which to step, slowed down my brisk gait to the easygoing tempo of former years. A flood of memories came over me as I went through one street after another: in this house I had attended a funeral; there Yurdan with considerable merriment had told me about his second courtship and marriage; around this corner had lived the only "old maid" in Dragalevtsy; and the Obshtina, or Municipal Building, now completely done, had settled down to being a definite part of Renaissance Square. 000

Bai Milush, I knew, would tell me about the Germans, so I stopped at his big wooden gate, and one of his sons escorted me to the house. Vicious dogs still protected the place and had to be kept at a safe distance, but these belied the warm greeting I received once I was within the house. First, I heard the story of the three oldest sons who no longer lived with their father but, true to their intent, had built homes of their own not far away. The other two married sons, who had been in the Army during much of my previous stay in Dragalevtsy, now lived with their wives and children in the old ancestral dwelling. Then, I looked over the score of pictures which I had taken in earlier, happier years and which were mounted on the wall as part of the family's most important mementos.

"We were foolish to declare war on America," he declared, before I got around to asking anything about the Germans. As he talked I knew that he was afraid Bulgaria had forfeited America's friendship. Like the old man that he was, he began to reminisce about the last World War and to recite how America had helped his defeated nation then. 648

648 "We would have starved," he said, "if America had not sent that ship of food to Varna on the Black Sea." Truly such an accomplishment by one ship would necessitate a cargo legendary in size, but nevertheless symbolized to Bai Milush and others of his generation the humanitarian America, the land of plenty, opportunity, and democracy. And then he told me of the work that Dominic Murphy, an American State Department representative in Bulgaria, had done in the wake of the last war to meet the relief needs of the people. And even Bai Milush knew that a street in Sofia bore Murphy's name transliterated into the Cyrillic alphabet.

000 Bai Milush's wife, his helpmate through the years, had survived the war too. She proffered food and drink and seemed relieved when I suggested that instead of eating then I would like to take a little of the cheese away with me to use in rounding out my meager hotel breakfasts in Sofia. Later, when I was photographing her outside, I realized that she was unsteady on her feet because she had taken too much *rakiya* as a medicine for a racking cough. *Rakiya* remained the cure-all for every ailment as well as the solace to every sorrow.

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511 Wherever I turned, whether to look at the new houses Bai Milush had erected, or to talk with the peasants about the past few years, I was impressed by the prosperity that the war had brought. Since I had last seen Dragalevtsy, almost one hundred new houses had made their appearance, constituting a decided boom for a village which had boasted only three hundred earlier. Some of these houses had been built as villas by people from Sofia because the city law prohibited any new construction there. The various bombardments had caused so much destruction in the city that nothing but repairs were allowed. Nevertheless, the peasants of Dragalevtsy themselves were replacing old homes with new ones simply because they could afford it now.

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511 I had already learned that during the war the peasants had been the favored element of the Bulgarian population; they had been paid good prices as incentives to increased production; earlier in the war they could use that money to buy articles which they had always wanted but had not been able to afford. For example, the number of radios in the village rose from three or four in 1937 to more than a hundred in 1944.

### CHAPTER XI

## COMMUNISM KNOCKS AT THE DOOR

668 COMMUNISM came in the dead of the night. Dragalevtsy people awoke on September 6, 1944, the morning after Russia had declared war on Bulgaria, to find big posters proclaiming throughout the village such slogans as "Welcome to the Heroic Red Army" or "Long Live Stalin."

The peasants realized in retrospect how well organized everything must have been, for these signs showed that the local Communist sympathizers had been ready for this big event. One or two had fought in the mountains against the Germans as Bulgarian Partisans and had been schooled in the part they were to play when the Germans were finally driven out.

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186 On September 16, 1944, at least eighty villagers from Dragalevtsy had gone to Sofia to welcome the Russians. Traditions live long in Dragalevtsy, and especially the tradition of brotherly Russia and its overwhelming contribution in emancipating Bulgaria from the Turks in 1878. So this demonstration of admiration for the Russians was genuine and spontaneous. Many parents took their children along so the youngsters could describe to their children and their children's children the excitement and greatness of this day. And the spectacle was one that was memorable, not like the arrival of the Nazis for whom there had been admiration mixed with fear, but rather the arrival of brother Slavs who would help Bulgaria grow great and strong. Thus the peasants had thought.

But news travels fast in Bulgaria and usually becomes altered in the traveling. Within five days, the people of Dragalevtsy heard so many rumors about the Russians that they soon had become afraid. They were especially nonplussed by the Russians' disregard for property. They heard about a man from another village who had been

hauling corn in his oxcart. Russian soldiers told him to stop, get out, 668
and give them the oxen, the cart, and the corn. He insisted that they 648
must pay him, at which they laughed. Stubborn as only a *Shop* peasant 186
can be, he sat rigidly in his cart to protect his own. From this point on versions differed: some said he was pulled out and beaten, others that he was shot and left dead by the roadside. And always the tale ended with, "The Germans always paid us, but the Russians never did."

But the Communists offered an explanation for the differences in the behavior of the two armies. The Russians invaded in battle order, which necessitated eating off the land on a catch-as-catch-can basis. The Germans, on the other hand, had sent large staffs ahead to make preparations for the coming of their troops. The net effect upon the peasant mentality was radically different, since property rights seemed violated by the Russians and respected by the Nazis.

Eventually a detachment of Russians had been established around Dragalevtsy. They frequented the taverns so constantly and with such enthusiasm that the peasants had a new saying: "There's nothing worse than drunken Russians." They began to judge the Russian nation by the off-time indulgences of its soldiers.

Although the "great disillusionment" regarding Russian soldiers 668
had begun soon after their arrival, the people still hoped that all would [661]
go well politically. Most of the major political parties—the Agrarians, the Zveno, and the Democrats—joined with the Communists in September, 1944, to form a coalition, which they called the Fatherland Front. It was this government that conducted the purge, or the sentencing of about three thousand men and women by the people's courts on the grounds of collaboration with the enemy. About two thousand of these were executed. Some observers now feel, in the light of later developments, that the real basis of selecting victims for trial was not only their complicity with the Germans but also their danger as potential rallying points for a counterrevolution against the Fatherland Front. Two Dragalevtsy young men were tried and executed for collaboration with the Nazis. According to village reports, Communist sympathizers tried to exert pressure upon the new priest in the hope of preventing his officiating at any funeral ceremonies or memorial services for these men. According to the Com-

[661] 668 munists, they were traitors. The priest still considered them children of God and officiated anyway, although they were not buried in the local cemetery.

[665] 648 By the New Year, 1945, many of the political leaders in the Fatherland Front discerned the handwriting on the wall. The Agrarians and the Democratic party especially recognized the Front for what it was—a Communist screen for actual control. All the while, the Communists—a minority party—had been growing stronger and were nurtured by the Red Army officers who really directed Bulgarian affairs. British and American army officers were represented in the Allied Control Commission which was under arbitrary Russian direction. American and British diplomatic representatives were somewhat more effectual, but only within a rather limited sphere of activity. With the cards stacked in their favor, the Communists controlled the key ministries, chief among them being the Ministry of Interior which had charge of the police and local administration. Therefore, early in 1945 there was a gradual loss of popular enthusiasm for the Fatherland Front, with the real defection coming in May. At that time the leading representatives of the Agrarian and Democratic parties, as well as a section of the Socialist party, withdrew from the Front to form an opposition. In Dragalevtsy, this move met with tremendous support, for there the Agrarian was the major party. The Zveno group, which had engineered the *coup d'état* of 1934 against the king, stayed with the Fatherland Front in which they held the premiership and other prominent positions.

A few former acquaintances of mine had joined the Communist party and were sincerely trying to win their fellow countrymen to their cause. They were inclined to be impatient with those who differed from them, and still felt very much on the defensive. Their condescending attitude toward members of other parties co-operating with them in the Fatherland Front was expressed in a comment making the round: "Oh, these other members of the Front are our 'water boys.' They'll carry the water to the top of the hill for us and then we'll take it over."

[666] The next political crisis arose in August, 1945. The government had scheduled an election through which it had planned to obtain a

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parliament, whose first duty would have been to approve the previous actions of the government and to give the Front broad powers to continue on its way of reform and reconstruction. Because of the claims by the opposition—those who had withdrawn from the Fatherland Front—that they were not being given a fair chance for representation in the elections, the American and British governments insisted that the elections be postponed and threatened to recognize no government coming into power under the proposed arrangements. The elections were postponed. Most Dragalevtsy people again wholeheartedly approved.

But that was the heyday of the opposition. Those who did not like the way matters were moving put their faith in America and expected her to stop further Communistic consolidation within the country. In the taverns of Dragalevtsy the buzzing must have reminded one of bees in a swarm when the Agrarian leader of the opposition, Georgi M. Dimitrov, sought refuge with the American Political Representative, Maynard B. Barnes, and spent part of the time in Barnes's villa near the Sofia-Dragalevtsy highway, with a handful of American soldiers on guard to protect Dimitrov whose life was endangered. The American authorities assumed some personal risks in sheltering him, and eventually secured his departure from the country. Thus, in the minds of the people as well as in the minds of the Bulgarian authorities, America more and more became identified as the chief support of the opposition and as an enemy of the new state being created. Because lines of antagonism had been drawn so sharply, the peasants of the opposition asked, "When will the war between America and Russia take place?" Those favoring the government asked in an uncertain tone, "Will there be a war between America and Russia?"

News of the atomic bomb gave the opposition increased hope since many of them expected America to use the bomb immediately as a threat in the bargaining and jockeying going on between the Western and Eastern powers.

American popularity rode another high wave when Secretary of State Byrnes sent Mark Ethridge to Bulgaria and Rumania to make a study of the situations in these two countries. Mr. Ethridge, a well known Louisville, Kentucky, newspaperman and a keen student of in-

648 668 ternational affairs, conducted himself with such astuteness that he became almost a legendary figure in a short time. In fact, he enters this account in an authentic way because he visited Dragalevtsy quite unexpectedly, ate meat balls at the tavern with the peasants, and endeared himself in particular by treating the crowd to two or three rounds of drinks. "Setting up the house" was a practice none too common in the frugal economy that characterized the village. Most of those present spoke quite freely, but two Russian soldiers, definitely ill-at-ease, remained stolidly silent. One old villager did throw caution to the winds and sidled up to tell the distinguished guest, "We are not satisfied, Mr. Ethridge. Don't believe all of the things these young fellows have been telling you." Mr. Ethridge, upon leaving the tavern, was surprised to see Renaissance Square filled with enthusiastic villagers, who cheered him and presented him with many bouquets of flowers.

[666] Later the Secretary of State's special emissary wrote a critical report on the existing Bulgarian government and pointed out what he judged to be its undemocratic features. The American representatives were unable, however, to persuade the Bulgarian authorities to postpone the elections for a second time, so the voting went off as scheduled on November 18, 1945, with the opposition groups abstaining from the balloting.

[687] In spite of these political developments, the peasants in the Agrarian party (the majority in Dragalevtsy) continued to regard Mr. Barnes and Mr. Ethridge in a favorable light. They like to tell stories of the way these Americans supposedly outwitted the Bulgarian authorities. One of these stories, with no foundation in fact, shows how rumors rise in the Balkans. Mr. Ethridge and his small party were said to have visited a concentration camp for political prisoners near Dupnitsa. Since they were planning to visit the historic and beautifully situated Rila Monastery, they obtained permission to stop off en route at this particular camp. According to the peasants' version, when the party arrived they found comparatively few people in the camp, the place was clean, and the prisoners seemed well cared for. That was that; farewells were said and the party moved on to the Monastery. Late in the afternoon, instead of going to the provin-

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cial town of Somokov as originally scheduled, Mr. Ethridge asked his driver when they reached a crossroad to take the fork of the road which circled back past Dupnitsa. Once more at the camp, he asked to be admitted and saw for himself the conditions of overcrowding all too evident when the prisoners who had been sent to the woods for the day were back in their quarters. Without wasting any words Mr. Ethridge merely smiled to the attendants, got back into the automobile, and returned to Sofia.

But stories of camps for political prisoners took my mind back to the 1930's when the government then in power was fearful of Communism and conducted frequent raids upon Communist-operated printing presses. Much doctrinaire literature was seized and the offenders were given heavy prison sentences. A member of an opposition group has never felt very safe in the Balkans. The Zveno group, which has already been mentioned, came into power in 1934 and which still was co-operating with the Fatherland Front, worked out a new wrinkle in the treatment of political prisoners. On March 19, 1935, I wrote in a letter to America:

> Just a little sidelight on political life in Bulgaria. Students who make radical speeches or editors who print little articles opposed to the *status quo* are forcefully invited to leave Sofia for a rest-cure in one of the provincial towns of Bulgaria. They go, for instance, to Karlovo and are "put up" by the government. They are perfectly free with the exception that they must stay in Karlovo, must report to an official at eight each morning, at noon, and must be in their room by eight in the evening, and cannot venture forth until eight the next morning. Such an "invitation" usually holds good for one month, after which the chastened individuals are permitted to return to Sofia, the political cauldron of Bulgaria.

More and more, Balkan governments must be judged not only in terms of the four freedoms which we publicize in America but also in terms of the governments which have preceded them. That is, they must be interpreted, although not justified, in the light of the cultural setting out of which they have sprung.

There was another apocryphal Ethridge story, which illustrated the use of humor as a weapon of the opposition groups to make their life more endurable. The scene was laid around Kyustendil, the chief

659 the Communist Government in 1949, sought to establish a uniform regime for all religious denominations in the country. Nevertheless, some of its provisions, especially Section 3, recognize the historic role of the Bulgarian Church and attempt to use the established tradition for the purposes of the communist policy.

Thus, the present status of the Church in Bulgaria cannot be properly evaluated without a survey of its past.

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## I. Christianity in Bulgaria, 865 -1870

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648 A sizable Bulgarian Kingdom came into being in 680 A.D. in the area between the Danube and the Black Sea bordering on the Balkan territories of Byzantium.

Seeking international recognition, one of its kings, Boris I, agreed in 865 A.D. to the conversion of his people to Christianity under the auspices of the Byzantine emperor and the Patriarch of Constantinople, Byzantine missionaries and priests were swiftly dispatched to Bulgaria to evangelize the country. Five years later, the Patriarch conceded, on insistent Bulgarian demands, the right of the Bulgarian King to have a Bulgarian archbishop with authority to crown kings and ordain bishops, retaining, nevertheless, supremacy over the new ecclesiastic hierarchy.

The extension of the Patriarch's authority to Bulgaria was disliked in Rome, and contacts were soon established between Boris and Pope Nicolaus I. However, the territorial proximity of Byzantium prevailed as a factor and Boris' original orientation

175 toward the East stayed. It became solidly rooted when in the
797 ensuing years he patterned the organization of his State after
648 Byzantium and introduced to Bulgaria adaptations of Byzantine law, such as the "Statute of Trial of Men", the "Nomocanon", etc.

[793] The new church strongly tended to emancipate itself from the primacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople and rid itself of Byzantine clergy. A fortunate chance presented itself when an alphabet was devised to suit the peculiarities of the Slavic tongues. A wave of Slav awakening hit Bulgaria during the reign of Boris' son, Simeon I, and soon scriptures and prayer books, in Bulgarian, displaced the media of Byzantine influence. The process was so rapid and his military victories so promising that Simeon proclaimed the archbishop of Preslav a patriarch independent of the Patriarch of Constantinople and himself Czar of the Bulgarians and the Greeks. Seven bishoprics were established, of which those of Preslav and Ochrida (Macedonia) became important centers of enlightenment.

Bulgaria turned again toward Rome in the 13th century. Desirous of international recognition which had been lost during the Byzantine domination of Bulgaria (1018 - 1186), the Bulgarian King Kaloyan contacted the Pope with an offer to accept the Pope's primacy over the Bulgarian church in exchange for an imperial crown. In 1204, a Catholic cardinal arrived at the Bulgarian capital Tirnovo to hand a crown tp Kaloyan on behalf of the Pope and ordain a Bulgarian prelate. This Western orientation caused by the Crusades and dictated by political expediency was rather
000 short-lived. In 1232, Kaloyan's successor, Ivan Asen, denounced

was ready to proclaim autocephalous under an Exarch or a Patriarch, as the Bulgarians would have it. 795 798

On such a basis, an agreement was soon reached, and on February 23, 1945, a protocol was signed by the Patriarch and the Bulgarian delegates, and ratified by the Holy Synods of the two churches. The schism separating the Bulgarian Church from the Patriarchate since 1871 was eliminated.

This result was greatly facilitated by the favorable attitude of Patriarch Benjamine himself. Sensing the end of his days was drawing nearer, he was determined to carry out the task of reconciliation and pacification before his death. He came from the southern part of Macedonia (incorporated into Greece in 1913), and there are good reasons to consider him as a Bulgarian. He had not lost his national feeling and wanted to express that feeling by taking the intiative of the rapproahement between the Greeks and the Bulgarians. His moral strength is all the more outstanding in view of his weak physical condition. The Apostolic Nuncio in Constantinople has said of him and his ideal: "that old man rises above the contingencies of everyday life in the pursuit of a great ideal in the service of God and of Humanity."

The protocol of February 23 was to recive a solemn confirmation by a visit of Exarch Stefan to Patriarch Benjamin. that visit was delayed by events until the second half of October 1945. In the meantime, the Patriarch suffered two heart attacks, and the composition of the Holy Synod of the Patriarchate had 795 798 648 been altered by one of the periodical re-shufflings, which had removed precisely the most zealous supporters of the reconciliation. The Patriarch had enough strength to impose the continued adherence to the decisions which had been made, but the atmosphere was not at all the same. Stefan's visit to Alexis and the fact that he arrived in Constantinople (Istanbul) as it were directly from Moscow, were widely exploited to cause alarm and suspicion in the old Ottoman capital where a Russian-Bulgarian maneuver aimed at gaining moral control of the city was always feared. These fears were tacitly shared by the Turkish Government, and consequently, there were many obstacles to be removed. Nevertheless, Mgr. Stefan's visit was very successful in the outcome. 795 798 648

Sofia tried to exploit that success and to widen the work of reconciliation to the peoples themselves, and not only to the churches. On October 30, 1945, Exarch Stefan handed to the Patriarch a short memorandum, in which the Bulgarian Government was asking the Patriarch to intercede before the Regent of Greece, Mgr. Damaskinos, in favor of the normalization of Greek-Bulgarian relations. Bulgaria decalred her readiness to repair all damages effectively caused by Bulgarian occupation authorities, taking into consideration, however, the public utility projects which the Bulgarians had undertaken in Greece. Bulgaria asserted that she had no purpose other than to establish friendly conditions of cooperation between the two countries. 648

To that Mgr. Damaskinos, then head of the Greek State, gave an evasive reply. He approved the lifting of the schism but refused to let himself be drawn into political matters by his religious superior. Besides, the latter died three months later, and his healthy influence on Greek-Bulgarian political reconciliation ceased. The U.S.S.R. supported this reconciliation very energetically, as the E.A.M., the Greek equivalent of the Bulgarian Fatherland Front, still thought it had a good chance of seizing power by peaceful means after its rebellion in the fall of 1944 had been bloodily and decisively repressed. The maneuver, if it had been successful, would probably have been ~~of~~ profit to the E.A.M.. But it would also have helped Greece and prevented the booodshed of the three following years. In any event its failure caused the Soviet Government and the Bulgarian Communists to scrap the ecclesiastic policy which they had drawn up in 1944, and the central figure in which had been Mgr. Stefan. The latter immediately lost all the value which he had held for the communists which would enable him to maintain some independence of action as Head of the Bulgarian Church. Now the communists no longer had any use for him and still had all the old reasons to distrust him because of his autoritarian attitude. 648

In effect, his election to the Exarchate and his visit to Istanbul had inflated his ego to a point where he began to believe that he had become a great factor in the life of the country, and he wanted to play a part proportionate to that importance. But, since it was the Fatherland Front who had elected him, he was confronted with evergrowing demands from the 793

010 above all have the principle of discipline and that of respect for his superiors inculcated in him, for no well-ordered State can survive without the existence of some form of hierarchy in it.

185 It must be admitted that the circumstances with which Bulgaria has had to contend were exceedingly adverse to the development and uplifting of the mass, necessary preliminaries to the exercise of democracy. The nation, dismembered at Berlin, directed all its energy to its reunion. To effect this purpose, it expended the greatest part of its resources on military preparations, and scant attention was given by the governing classes to cultural enterprise. Though many far-seeing Bulgarians, amongst whom Stoyan Mihailovsky, maintained that the policy pursued was wrong, and that a cultural development was the indispensable prerequisite to territorial aggrandisement. Bulgaria's ethnic unification being more easily attained by a process of evolution, and the establishment of a Balkan federation — these views naturally found little favour or encouragement with the classes which wielded power.

648 Moreover, the ruling classes succumbed to foreign influence, Russian or Austrian, whose object was to keep the Balkan nations in as backward a state as possible, in order to turn them more easily into blind tools for themselves. So that the moral ascendency which the outward world, and especially those great empires with which Bulgaria was in close touch, exerted on her, instead of being edifying and elevating was, on the contrary, demoralising and pernicious in the extreme, Dr. D. N. Popov, the biographer of Kosta Arseniev (1864-1899), an exemplary honest democratic politician, alluded in the following terms to that stormy period of Bulgaria's history. „Demagogy created immorality. Electoral abuses, brigandage below, and corruption above, became endemic. Some would have tied Bul-

648 garia to St Petersburgh, others wanted her chained to London, another party preferred Vienna, while a certain section had preferences for Berlin, and yet another group insisted that Bulgaria's foreign policy should be conducted from Constantinople. Unhappy land, her leaders endeavoured to tie her simultaneously to several mutually antagonistic protectors, and thus unwittingly acted against the interests of their country. Bulgaria suffered not so much from the treason of her neighbours, as from the shortsightedness and lack of scruples of those directing our foreign policy, in association with foreign consuls, whose protégés they were". (Kosta Arseniev, pp. 35-6.).

177 What moral forces remained, having survived Bulgaria's Europeanization, a process which was tantamount to the elimination of the patriarcal traditions of the Bulgarians, and their replacement by what was nothing but a thin veneer of civilization — were wholly absorbed in their confict with Tsar Ferdinand, that great factor of evil in their country.

661 517 He, in a true Machiavellian spirit, spread corruption broadcast, and vitiated the intelligentsia, in order to render all opposition to him impracticable and impossible. The diabolical refinements with which that process was pursued were set forth by Stoyan Mihailovsky, in his „Book for the Bulgarian people", published in 1897. The ease with which the intelligentsia succumbed to the malign influences which surrounded it, is chiefly due to its extreme poverty. Having sundered all connection with the peasant, artisan or trading class, from which he sprang, the intellectual scorned the idea of obtaining his livelihood by any other means than that of state employ. This desire to get employment under the Government, which is almost a passion among the Bulgarians, could not be satisfied in respect of every claimant owing to the limited number of public posts, and led to the formation of a legion of

652 655 object being mainly to effect a better control and levelling of prices in all parts of the country. The one for school text books has been created in order to reduce prices and to prevent the too frequent change of the books made use of in schools, a practice much in vogue in Bulgaria and by which students were exploited to the advantage of certain publishers closely connected with political circles.

Minister P. Todorov took the initative to fuse into one under the title of „Bulgarian Credit" all the provincial banks of the country in order to strengthen their position and reduce their running expenses. The State provided for this purpose a sum of 50 million leva, while the capital of the amalgamated banks amounts to about 100 millions. Eventually it is proposed to increase the capital to 250 million leva. The two State banks, the „Agricultural" and „Central Co-operative bank" have likewise been merged into one to the great advantage of the State and of the co-operative societies as may be inferred from the writer's notes on the co-operative movement.

654 The Ministry of Finance began to tackle also the problem of the excessive protection granted to the local industry which rendered the prices of all industrial products unapproachable to the impoverished agrarian masses. The advantages and prerogatives hitherto enjoyed by industrial establishments have been curtailed in many directions and the preference they enjoyed over their foreign rivals in so far as supplies to government institution is concerned has in fact been removed.

652 648 Other reforms, having as an object the stabilisation of the civil service, the simplification of judicial procedure, the transformation of the educational system etc, were being studied and would have been shortly applied when unexpectedly the Cabinet of M. Gheorghiev was asked to resign and cease its creative action. on the alleged pre-

tence that some of its members and supporters entertained republican sympathies. Bulgarians who for the first time in their modern history had been at last privileged to witness at home how a decent government should function would if they were free to express their opinion probably demur at the chenge invoking in support Pope's dictum:

> „For forms of government let fools contest,
> What e'er is best administered is best".

What is not devoid of a certain piquancy is that the Financial Committee of the League of Nations „which had just rapped the late Government smartly over the administrative knuckles" (as stated in an editorial in the *Manchester Guardian* at the end of January 1935) should have provided the opportunity for this stroke. And yet the Financial Committee should above all have been thankful to M. Peter Todorov for his financial measures. Thus the creation of the monopoly of alcohol will vastly increase the revenues affected specially to the service of the Refugee Loan which was issued under the sponsorship of the League of Nations. But of course, the interests of the unwary investors in League of Nations Loans are no longer considered. Those of others take priority. M. Todorov's financial projects apparently were not to the liking of some oil magnates, and of the French, Belgian and Swiss capitalists who have respectively some 377·3, 568·4 and 533 million leva invested in banking and industrial enterprises in Bulgaria. His threat to reduce the tariff, and his creation of a powerful credit institution which would be in a position to compete with the foreign banks naturally provoked a certain amount of wire-pulling and log-rolling as a consequence of which M. Todorov has lost his portfolio.

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| Categories aud numbers of farmsteads | | Area owned Hectares | Area devoted solely to cereals. Hectares | Percentage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Self-sufficing in cereals | 41,297 | 1,125,443·7 | 818,798 9 | 3·64 |
| Buying cereals | 236,047 | 3,050,087·6 | 2,259,841·1 | 9·76 |
| Having a surplus of cereals | 439,235 | 28,845,318·9 | 20,064,752·3 | 86.70 |

241 648 What has so far been advanced is, it is to be hoped, enough to show that on one hand the lesser farmsteads are scarcely self-supporting and that on the other hand the larger farms, owing to the fall in the price of cereals, are unable to meet their liabililies. If 80% of the population is therefore in such a state of indigence and unable to pay any taxes, one can easily surmise in what poverty the whole nation must be struggling since its entire economic structure is based on agriculture, which has ever been its mainstay. This most regrettable state of affairs is largely due to those who drafted the Peace Treaties. Obviously, it was nothing short of a crime to deprive Bulgaria of such land as was indispensable for her population, and which had been in her possession, or was mainly inhabited by a Bulgarian population, and transfer it to her neighbours, all of whom had received vast increases in territory, and were in no need of further land. This wilful pauperisation of a people which was not only despoiled of its most fertile provinces, but obliged to house and feed some 400,000 destitute refugees, driven away from the territories so thoughtlessly transferred to the neighbouring States, is undoubtedly one of the causes which led the American people to wash its hands off European affairs in disgust, and this may be easily understood, for the American delegation at the Peace Conference in its desire to secure a just and enduring settlement, most sturdily upheld the cause of Bulgaria. 000 Nor can the politicians responsible for these obtuse arrangements of the Peace Treaties plead in extenuation that they were actuated in their drafting by the biblical

499 661 furnish the means wherewith it could be carried out. Which shows that all financiers will not play the part of Mephistopheles to the Bulgarian Faust by tempting him with endless loans, as has happened quite recently and as holders of League of Nations' Loans have learnt to their loss. This whimsical scheme caused the fall of the Stoilov Cabinet in 1899 and was mainly brought about by the intervention of Ferdinand who overtly accused his Finance Minister of realising seven million leva out of these dubious transactions. It must not be thought that Ferdinand was prompted in this act by a desire to safeguard from dilapidation the public purse. He must have certainly been coaxed on by the avidity of the Minister in question who probably wished to keep most of these seven millions for himself.

499 648 With regard to inter-Balkan communications, it may be said that all the palaver of the Balkan conferences has not led to any practical decision. The Bulgarian proposal for the construction of a bridge across the Danube at Rustchuk, to link up the Bulgarian and Rumanian railway system, has been repeatedly rejected by the Rumanians and it was only at the end of 1934 that they made a slight concession by acquiescing to the plying of a ferryboat between Rustchuk and Giurgiu. As navigation on the Danube is suspended during the winter and the level of the river varies very considerably when in spate, the utilisation of the ferry boat will only be possible for a few months in the year, and the advantages to be derived proportionately restricted. The Greeks too have not responded to the Bulgarian suggestion of linking up their railways through the valley of the Struma, though the Bulgarians are pushing on with the construction of a broad gauge railway which will shortly reach Gorna Djuma. The extension of this line to the Greek frontier is estimated as likely to cost 328.7 million leva. It is only the Yugoslav Government

499 648 which has shown more consideraton to Bulgarian requirements and has agreed to join up its railways at two other points besides Tsaribrod, namely at Vidin and at Giushevo, the present terminus of the Sofia-Kustendil line which will be prolonged to Kumanovo. When the construction of this line will be achieved, the present railway journey Sofia — Salonica will be shortened by a third of its present duration by the avoidance of the long way round through Nisch.

### *Roads*

491 652 The total length of semi-permanent or macadamised roads in Bulgaria in 1934, was of 17071 klm. and there were another 7,125 klm. in construction. Of the existing milage, 8,397 klm. were reported to be in good condition, 4,991 klm. in medium condition, and 4,103 as in a bad condition. The new Government planned to construct another 4000 klm. of roads and contemplates spending a sum of two milliard leva on this project, completing every year some 400 klm. of new roads. It has created new taxes in order to provide the necessary funds, among which is a special road tax of 140 leva a year to be levied on all males between the ages of 20 and 55. Owners of motor cars will also contribute to the maintenance of the roads by paying increased sums for their driving licences, It is expected that some 300 million leva will be raised annually by these special taxes, 2/3 of which are proposed to be spent on the building of the new roads and 1/3 for the upkeep of those already existing.

499 It is proposed to construct at once an arterial road of 300 klm. between Sofia and Orhanie, trying different systems and materials in order to find out which is the most suitable for local conditions. It is aimed to have the new roads laid out properly, in order that they may not need repairing for the first ten years. The compulsory

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665 668 guarantee certain elementary human rights, the enjoyment of which the League of Nations has never attempted to secure for these minorities.

At the elections of 1931, in spite of the fact that the Communist party had been outlawed and the endless persecution it was exposed to, yet it succeeded in sending 12% of the deputies elected to the Sobranye camouflaged as working men.

The extreme wretchedness of the bulk of the nation and the mass of destitute refugees have created new foci for Communist proselytism, and the country is to-day literally honeycombed with Bolshevism which only awaits a favourable opportunity to break out. Until quite recently, Communism was openly professed to be the coming form of government, and both peasant families and bourgeois, hastened alike to enroll officially some of their members in this party in order to secure an eventual protector on its advent which was considered imminent.

## FERDINAND AT THE HELM

661 648 Having with the support of the united Opposition got rid of the man who brough him to Bulgaria and who consolidated his throne, and having in turn made use of its services in order to reconcile himself with Russia, Ferdinand hastened to sow discord and suspicion among the members of the Stoilov Cabinet, so as to get rid of them now that with their help he had achieved his purpose. He thus intrigued against Gueshov, Madjarov and Stoilov, complaining alternatively to each of his other colleagues, using insinuations, slander and insult.[1]

In 1899 Grekov was entrusted with the formation of a new Ministry with the support of the Radoslavovists who far outnumbered his adherents. At the elections the Rado-

[1] Cf. V. T. Veltchev's: „Pages of our new political history".

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slavovists secured a big majority and they insisted on 661 Radoslavov becoming Prime Minister. Ferdinand however, in order to disunite the party insisted and obtained the 648 nomination of Todor Ivantsev to the post. This administration was characterised by the boisterous atmosphere it created both internally and externally. By its financial measures it provoked the peasantry to revolt, while in its foreign relations, Bulgaria was involved in a very severe conflict with Rumania which brought the two countries to the verge of war. The dispute arose through the activities of the Macedonians in Rumania. They murdered in Bucarest a Rumanian propaganda agent who worked in Macedonia against the Bulgaro-Macedonians. Another incident provoked by these same Macedonians intensified the dispute. In order to raise funds for their revolutionary campaign in Macedonia they rifled the safe of a wealthy Rumanian, but were unable to utilise the stolen banknotes and bonds in Rumania. They then hit on an ingenious though sacrilegious device for smuggling their booty out of the country. They approached the Bulgarian Government and persuaded it that it was highly desirable that the remains of the revolutionary Rakovski which were lying in Bucarest should be transported and interred in Bulgaria. This demand when formulated by the Bulgarian authorities was readily conceded by the Rumanian Government. The Macedonians hid in the coffin under the remains of Rakovski the stolen valuables and safely transferred them to Bulgaria, whence they attempted to negotiate them, but were found out by the police and arrested. The Bulgarian Government, by refunding the amount involved, finally put an end to the incident.

Early in 1901 this Ministry was dismissed, and Ferdinand 661 confided to General Ratso Petrov the task of supervising the holding of elections in order that a new

661 government should be formed. Petrov attempted to form a party of his own, but his right hand man, Yovev, became compromised in a shady affair together with other would-be supporters who had organised the emission of spurious revenue stamps and the evolution of this highly „progressive" party was thus nipped in the bud. Thus unable to elect his own men, Petrov thought it expedient to allow full liberty to his opponents, and for once free elections were held in Bulgaria. They resulted in the formation of a coalition government composed of the followers of Karavelov and Danev, the two most numerous parties. Owing to the opposition which the projected creation of a tobacco monopoly aroused, Karavelov resigned and Danev assumed sole control after holding fresh elections which secured for him a majority in the Sobranye. He instituted proceedings against the Radoslavov administration and secured the condemnation of Radoslavov and of several of his colleagues for the abuses they committed during their short term of office. He enacted a law guaranteeing stability in the tenure of office for public functionaries, a measure which had it been maintained would have rendered the parliamentary regime operative in Bulgaria by eliminating most of the disadvantages it otherwise gave rise to.

648 During Danev's tenure of office, a military convention was signed with Russia in 1902, clearly defined as a counter measure to the one concluded between Austria-Hungary and Rumania in 1901. It was stipulated that the convention was not aimed against any other State save the above two, Russia guaranteed the integrity of Bulgarian terrritory and Bulgaria agreed that the Commander-in-chief, and chief of the general staff, of the Bulgarian army, would be nominated with the approval of the Tsar, while a Russian staff officer would be attached to every Bulgarian army corps.

## FERDINAND AT THE HELM

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The 25th anniversary of Bulgaria's liberation was celebrated with great ceremony, and a magnificent church erected at the Shipka Pass, was consecrated in the presence of Russian dignitaries and veterans of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877, in honour of whom an extensive concentration of Bulgarian troops had taken place. The Macedonians were hoping that after the Shipka ceremonies the signal would be given for the troops to invade and liberate Macedonia, but Danev at the instigation of the Russian Minister, Lamsdorf, took measures to repress this agitation since Russia was unable to lend her help while entangled in the Far East.

The unconditional subjection of Danev to Russian guidance was not requited by Russian support to the Bulgarian cause. Lamsdorf attempted to win over Serbia by pressing the Sultan to nominate a Serbian bishop at Uskub and this was considered in Bulgaria as a formal abandonment by Russia of the programme she had set forth in the Treaty of San Stefano. When the edict announcing the appointment of the new Serbian bishop was issued, mass meetings were held all over Bulgaria and Danev was forced to resign in May 1903, having lost much of his popularity. Ferdinand. perceiving that besides his recognition he could not extort any other advantage from Russia, executed a complete political somersault by placing the Austrophile Stambulovist party in power, then under the leadership of Stambulov's lieutenant, D. Petkov, though for the first few years Ferdinand imposed as Prime Minister his favourite, General Ratso Petrov. The Stambulovists unable to secure a majority at the polls now that the police and State functionaries could not be dismissed without cause. thanks to the law passed by Danev, rescinded this measure with the approval of Ferdinand, and after filling the administrative posts with their nominees, proceeded to carry elections according to the old system.

# BULGARIA-PAST & PRESENT

648 At the request of Ferdinand, the new Sobranye hastened to vote an amnesty, exonerating Radoslavov and his colleagues of the delinquencies for which they had been condemned. Hardly had the elections taken place than a revolution broke out in Macedonia. Measures had been taken by the Powers to introduce certain reforms in Macedonia and by 1903 the Sultan appointed Hilmi Pasha as inspector-General. These concessions made by the Turks brought no amelioration and in July 1903 the Macedonians rose in revolt, in the hope of forcing the hand of Europe for they were conscious that without outside support they stood no chance against the Turks. This decision was taken by the revolutionaries in the absence, and against the desire, of the great Macedonian chief, Gotse Deltsev, who considered such an insurrection as inopportune. Some 12000 Macedonians and 2000 Thracians took up arms, and after obtaining certain initial successes were completely crushed by the Turkish troops. The outcome was that 201 villages and 12,444 houses were burnt, 4694 people killed, 70,835 rendered homeless, and 30,000 forced to seek shelter in Bulgaria. (Cf. Chr. Silianov: „The 1903 Revolution in Macedonia"). After this disaster, the Powers decided to impose the so-called Mürzsteg programme of reforms in Macedonia, which was divided into five zones each of which was placed under the surveillance of a great Power.

661 The turmoil in the Turkish provinces provided an unprecedented opportunity to Ferdinand for indulging in his petty scheme of creating an enriched class on whose support he might count in exchange for the favours bestowed on them. Large orders for war material were placed, out of which the favourites of Ferdinand reaped big profits in the form of bribes or commissions. The chronicles of those years are filled with the echoes of a resounding affair known as the „Charles-Jean" trial, which revealed the

reinforced by the countless derelictions committed by the Government, brought about the creation of a strong coalition block composed of the greater part of the Opposition forces, which finally succeeded in bringing about the fall of the Stambulovist regime a few months after the assassination of the Prime Minister, Petkov in 1907. 661

Except for the Macedonian revolution and the ensuing straining of Turco-Bulgarian relations, the only other event with regard to Bulgaria's foreign policy was the conclusion of an agreement with Serbia in 1905. Both countries feeling isolated while Russia was engaged in a war with Japan, sought to protect themselves mutually. Bulgaria facilitated the access of Serbian goods to the sea through her territory, and in exchange obtained a mitigation of Serbian propaganda in Macedonia. Austria-Hungary however, did not at all approve of this rapprochement between the two Balkan States and persuaded Serbia to abrogate the convention with Bulgaria in exchange for facilities for her imports of cattle in the Danubian monarchy. 648

Early in 1908 the Democratic party under Malinov, who had succeeded to the leadership after Karavelov's death, assumed power. This party though it formed part of the Opposition block, which had pledged itself not to accept office direct from the palace forgot all about this solemn pledge when it was invited to assume power. The most noteworthy occurrences during its stay in office were, the Young Turk revolution which was precipitated by the Anglo-Russian agreement at Reval, and the emergence of a nationalistic government in Turkey which stultified all efforts at a rapprochement between it and its Balkan neighbours. By their arrogant attitude and by threatening to incorporate anew both Bulgaria and Bosnia within the Ottoman Empire, the Young Turks forced Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria to concert together and decide on the formal annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria and on

Bulgaria declaring its independence. This course of action was probably decided on between the Emperor Francis-Joseph and Ferdinand at a meeting in Budapest on September 22, 1908, where Ferdinand had been received with royal honours.

The slighting of the Bulgarian envoy at Constantinople furnished a pretext for Bulgaria to proclaim her independence at Tirnovo on October 5, 1908, when Ferdinand assumed the title of Tsar of all Bulgarians. The Turkish Government at the instigation of its French creditors demanded that the tribute payable by Bulgaria should be paid in order that her independence should be recognised. This brought on a retort by Malinov that "one's independence is not purchased with money". Ferdinand hastened to disavow his Prime Minister by instructing his envoy in Paris to declare that "Bulgaria was a good payer". This calmed the Turks, and negotiations were opened as to the amount to be paid. The divergence of opinions seemed unbridgeable, Turkey began demanding territorial concessions and Bulgaria decreed a partial mobilisation of her army, fearing a Turkish attack. It was then that Russia intervened in Constantinople agreeing to pay to Turkey the sum she was claiming from Bulgaria and reducing the Turkish debt to Russia by an equivalent amount, while accepting from Bulgaria the sum the latter was offering, namely 82 million leva. The incident was thus settled, and Bulgaria's independence acknowledged first by Russia and then by all the other Powers. The service rendered by Russia encouraged the Malinov Ministry to make overtures to the Russian Foreign Minister, Izvolsky, for an understanding between the two countries which would eventually facilitate the realisation of Bulgaria's aspirations. Izvolsky submitted a scheme according to which Bulgaria bound herself to place at the disposal of Russia all her military forces in case of Russia being at war with Germany, Austria, Rumania and Turkey. In case Rumania or Turkey attacked Bulgaria, she was to be succoured by Russia. In the event of a successful war against Austria and Rumania, Russia bound herself to help Bulgaria to recover all the Dobrudja, in case of a war against Turkey, Bulgaria could count on Russia's support for securing territorial expansion within the limits fixed by the San Stefano Treaty. 648

In the beginning of 1910 Malinov visited Izvolsky at St. Petersburg and the negotiations were pursued. Malinov demanded the inclusion of Adrianople and Salonica within the territory claimed by Bulgaria. Izvolsky, while agreeing to the inclusion of Salonica, rejected the demand for a Bulgarian expansion to the east, and this caused a hitch in the negotiations which were not resumed. The Bulgarian Government desired that a date should be fixed for declaring war on Turkey as it could not wait indefinitely and see its co-nationals exterminated in Turkey. Russia however, was not prepared for a war in the near future and demanded that the moment should be chosen by her. The Malinov Cabinet simultaneously made efforts to come to an understanting with Greece and Serbia about Macedonia, but without any practical results. Serbia wished for its partition, while the Bulgarian Government aimed at merely securing autonomy for it. Subsequently, Ferdinand attempted to negotiate on his own accord with Austria, but as these dealings were violently denounced by Izvolsky in the Duma, they were discontinued.

Internally there was an improvement in the administration,* 661 though the partisan spirit was alway manifest. The Minister of the Interior, Takev, did not hesitate to tout electors with such promises as: "Vote for us and we shall give you free access to the forests to cut down as much timber as you like". An incident of small impor-

*[During the administration of the Malinov Cabinet — Analyst]

11: Logio S-4 (no date) 1936 EE1 Bulgaria EE1

641 tance which occurred at Rustchuk in 1909 led to the army being ordered to fire and sabre the civilian population, over thirty innocent people being killed and a hundred wounded owing to the crazy orders issued by the Government. A strike which occurred on the Oriental Railways was taken advantage of by the Government to take over the lines in south Bulgaria and henceforth these were exploited in common with the State railways. The elevation of Bulgaria to the rank of a kingdom postulated certain alterations in the Constitution of the country which had to be legalised by an extraordinary Sobranye, and a coalition Cabinet presided over by Gueshov and Danev was entrusted with the task of convoking it. in the summer of 1911 in order to approve of the changes and simultaneously to concede to the King the right to conclude secret treaties with foreign States. This last measure was deemed necessary for a satisfactory conclusion of the negotiations the Balkan States were pursuing amongst themselves for the purpose of putting a stop to the persecution of their co-nationals in Turkey. For since the advent to power of the Young Turks who aimed at the forcible denationalisation of the Christians in Turkey, the lot of the latter had become intolerable and had convinced the rulers of the Balkan States that it was imperative to arrive at a common agreement whereby their interests might be properly safeguarded.

## THE BALKAN ALLIANCE AND WARS

648 Bulgaria had always been a partisan of the indivisibility of Macedonia and as she was unable to annex it without coming to a clash with her neighbours, she staunchly supported the plan of creating an autonomous Macedonia in which the prepoderance of the Bulgarian element would

assure her mastery. This was the reason why the repeated advances made so far by Greece and Serbia as to undertaking a joint action against Turkey had always been cold-shouldered by Bulgaria, who preferred instead to be on good terms with Turkey and to cultivate friendly relations with the Sultan in order to secure for her Bulgarian co-nationals in Turkey fair treatment and better chances for their cultural development.

The change of regime in Turkey and the Bulgarian declaration of independence rendered the pursuit of the policy hitherto followed, almost impossible. The close commercial relations between vassal and suzerain were sundered. Turkey, which was the best market for Bulgarian produce was closed, while persecution to which Bulgarians in Turkey were subjected grew daily worse. The Greeks who were among the most numerous ethnic minorities in the Ottoman Empire were likewise oppressed, and with the advent of Venizelos to power in Athens, who had taken an active part in emancipating his native Crete from the Turkish yoke, it was not surprising that he should have done his utmost to approach Bulgaria in order to convince her of the advisability of united action against a common foe. Taking advantage of the presence in Athens of Mr. Bourchier, the *Times* Balkan correspondent in the spring of 1911, Venizelos submitted to Ferdinand and Gueshov a proposal for a defensive alliance between Bulgaria and Greece. Serbia, since the Bosnian crisis had repeatedly sought the support of Bulgaria, but it was only in October 1911 that Gueshov responded to the advances made by the Serbian Premier Milovanovitch. The two rival theses, autonomy and partition, each stubbornly supported by Bulgaria and Serbia seemed irreconcilable, though Milovanovich did his utmost to win Gueschov to his view by holding out to him the assurance that Bulgaria would only have to cede the Uskub district to Serbia and would retain for herself the larger part of Macedonia and the whole vilayet of Adrianople. It was then that another factor, the influential Russian Minister at Belgrade, Hartwig, intervened and made agreement possible after months of stubborn negotiations. Russia, through her ambassador Tsarykov had proposed to Turkey in the autumn of 1911 a scheme under which she would influence the Balkan States to maintain friendly relations with her and would equally guarantee her capital in return for which she asked of Turkey to open the Straits to Russian warships. This proposal had been turned down by Turkey, and this prompted Russia to seek another solution by furthering an understanding between the Balkan States wherely she might reach a more favourable settlement of the question of the Straits. A treaty between Bulgaria and Serbia was signed in March 1912 promising mutual support and providing for common action against Turkey. The distribution of territorial gains was specified.

All territory to the east of the Struma was to revert to Bulgaria, and that west of the Shar mountains to Serbia, while Macedonia proper was divided into three zones; two zones respectively Serbian and Bulgarian, and a contested one which would be subject to the arbitration of the Tsar. A Treaty with Greece was concluded in May 1912, but the mutual claims of the two contracting parties were not defined. These arrangements were completed by an agrement with Montenegro, Bulgaria engaging herself to pay for the upkeep of the men Montenegro would mobilise. It appears that the conclusion of this Balkan league was not to the liking of Tsar Ferdinand owing to the fact that it was distinctly anti-Austrian, and he had to be cajoled into accepting it by the granting of a solatium in the guise of an advance of 3,000,000 francs by Russia, which were secured by a mortgage on his country estate at Vranya. This was revealed by deputy N. Harlakov in the Sobranye on

March 3,1918, and reiterated by a communist deputy on 648 May 25,1932. Ferdinand did not sign the mobilisation order until the money was advanced to him.[1]

The Powers to whom the existence of the Balkan 721 Alliance had become known, made a belated attempt to impose the acceptance of reforms on Turkey in order to avoid the threatened war, and even Sazonov, at the instigation of France ,did his best to restrain the combative mood of the Balkan States which he had encouraged, but an Albanian revolt, and a massacre of Bulgarians in the Macedonian town of Kotsana, followed by tbe massing of Turkish troops in Thrace, forced the hands of the Balkan States, which replied by hurriedly mobilising their armies. On October 8, Montenegro declared war on Turkey, the Porte followed by declaring war on Serbia and Bulgaria on the 17 th, and finally Greece declared war on Turkey on the 18 th. The Bulgarian victories in Thrace were not utilised to the full owing to tne mutual jealousies of the commanding generals. General Kutintchev, the commander of the first army refused to lend his support to the third army under General Radko Dimitriev at Lule Burgas because he had been frustrated in his hopes that both the first and third army

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[1] A few years ago a Communist interpellated the German government in the Reichstag as to the disbursements which were being made to Ferdinand, and it was then revealed that this modern Judas had received thirty million marks in order to involve Bulgaria in the world war on the side of the Central Powers, and that moreover he was drawing a yearly allowance. In a resounding interview published in the Austro-German press immediately after his abdication, Ferdinand had boasted that for thirty years he had faithfully served the interests of the Central Empires so that there is nothing untoward if the Germans are now granting him a pension.

Madol in his "Ferdinand of Bulgaria" p. 233 attempts to dispel the depressing impression caused by these revelations of the contemptible behaviour of his patron by offering what could only be a very lame apology.

"Those who are willing to sign without any alterations should do so immediately. Those who are not disposed to sign had better leave London". 728

On May 30 the Treaty was signed, Turkey ceding all territory to the east of the Midia-Enos line to the Balkan Allies.

Long before the settlement with Turkey was arrived at, it became evident that there was a serious threat of conflict breaking out among the Allies over the spoils. The Serbians had first excited the distrust of Bulgarian circles when Passitch sent a circular letter on September 28, 1912, to Serbian representives in the European capitals, urging them to make known to the governments to which they had been accredited, that the term "Old Serbia" included the towns of Uskub, Kumanovo, Tetovo, Deber, Prilep and Ochrida. The first four of which were in the contested, and the last two in the incontested zone. It was a clear indication that certain Serbian circles did not mean to abide by the treaty and this propensity was intensified when it became evident that Austria-Hungary and Italy would not permit Serbia to secure an outlet on the Adriatic. The Serbians when they found that Bulgaria was harbouring the ambition to enter Constantinople and was for this purpose unduly protracting the war instead of concluding an advantageous peace with Turkey, suggested a revision of the Treaty in their favour. So justified did they consider their demands, and in this they were encouraged by Mr. Hartwig, the Russian Minister at Belgrade, that they proceeded to expel the Bulgarian priests and schoolmasters in that part of Macedonia which according, to the Treaty was to revert to Bulgaria.

This behaviour of the Serbians naturally incensed the Bulgarians, who, though hard bargainers, are in contrast with other Balkan peoples, most scrupulously strict in fulfilling any undertaking they assume, and naturally expect 648

648 that others should carry out their part of the bargain. Passions would certainly not have flamed up as they did if it had not been for the Macedonian immigrants in Bulgaria, who exerted themselves to their utmost to incite the Bulgarians against their allies, rejecting every idea of compromise and insisting on the integral attribution of [563] their native country to Bulgaria. It should be remembered that the Macedonians formed a most influential element in the political life of Bulgaria. They occupied commanding posts in all the branches of the administration and in the army, in which were some 800 officers of Macedonian origin, while the number of those who enlisted for service in the war against Turkey reached 15,000. They had always carried on a persistent propaganda in favour of involving Bulgaria in a war for the liberation of their country and the most arduous task of Bulgarian governments has been to bridle their attempts to brew trouble with the suzerain Power in Macedonia. Fanatically inspired by the idea of liberating their native country, they were utterly deaf to all counsels of prudence. Having been driven away from their native land their sole aspiration was to see it liberated so that they might return to it. Their uncompromising spirit may be gauged by the attitude of D. Rizov (the Bulgarian diplomatic agent in Rome at the time, and later nominated to the same post in Berlin), which is revealed in the Report of the Parliamentary Commision of Inquiry, vol. I p. 455. He wired to Gueshov on April 25, 1913, not to concede anything to the Serbs and repulse them to the north of the Shar mountains even though this was to be achieved through a war with both Serbians and Greeks. Other Macedonians did not hesitate to threaten both Danev and Ferdinand with death whenever the former showed himself inclined to accept Russia's arbitration. There were hotheads even among the Bulgarians, like the national poet

Vazov, who published a fiery poem invoking eternal damnation on "the hand which would sign away Macedonia."

The unpardonable error of the Bulgarians was in neglecting to come to an understanding with the Greeks, especially since Venizelos showed himself most conciliatory towards the Bulgarians and repeatedly offered to cede Cavalla to them, and only insisted, on retaining Salonica for Greece. Even Sazonov warned Bulgaria to hasten and conclude an agreement with Greece as this would facilitate him in his efforts to render Serbia more amenable to reason. The Greek Government, as early as November 18, invited Bulgaria to submit the question of the repartition of territories to the Entente Powers, but Bulgaria answered evasively. Before the dispatch of the Balkan delegates to London, Venizelos offered to meet Gueshov, but the latter declined. When the Greek Premier learnt in London that Bulgaria was claiming Salonica, he endeavoured to meet all the Bulgarian demands, and only refused to yield up that town. But the Bulgarians were unyielding on this point and not only refused to negotiate with the Greeks but even rejected Sazonov's expostulations to allow this matter to be arbitrated on. The pig-headed Danev threw all restraint to the winds and dared declare to Sazonov at St. Petersburgh on March 13, 1913, „that we shall take Salonica in spite of the opposition of Greece and Serbia." (Report of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry vol. I. p. 590.) In a conversation with Izvolsky in Paris, T. Todorov, the then Minister of Finance, declared that the Bulgarian Government had decided not to resort to the services either of Russia or of the Entente Powers for arbitration with Greece, while Danev informed Isvolsky that Bulgaria would accept to resort to arbitration only in case Russia would guarantee beforehand the award of Salonica to Bulgaria. (Op. cit. vol. I. p. 481 and 493). Such intransigeance on

648 the part of the Bulgarian Ministers is explained by the fact that Ferdinand having lost all hopes of capturing Constantinople had set his heart on securing Salonica which hs declared to be the Mecca of the Bulgarians. This helped to throw the Greeks into the arms of the Serbians, to the despair of Venizelos, who was ready to make the utmost sacrifices in order to maintain the Balkan League. [1]

The secret Greco-Serbian protocol signed on May 19, which resulted, stiffened the obduracy of the Serbians and further exasperated the Bulgarians who looked on it as an open plot to deprive them of the fruits of their victory. Each side made feverish preparations for war. Gueshov in his deposition to the Commission of Inquiry (op. cit. vol. I. p. 145), asserts that prior to deciding as to whether Bulgaria was to accept arbitration the Ministerial Council convoked early in April the military chiefs in order to consult them as to whether the Bulgarian army was in a position to overcome the united forces of the Greeks and Serbians. All answered affirmatively, except General Fitchev. Venizelos likewise sounded the Greek Staff as to the chances of Bulgaria's success in a struggle against the united Serbian and Greek army and it is reported that these were assessed at 60%, which may account to a certain extent for his moderation. The Bulgarian Premier, from the first, did nothing to curtail the interference of the Crown in the conduct of the military operations and in the diplomatic negotiations. Instead of taking advantage of Kiamil Pasha's offer of peace on October 29, to put a stop to the war, he allowed Ferdinand to intervene and protract it needlessly, wasting thereby Bulgaria's manhood and encouraging her allies and neighbours in their desire to despoil her. He did not react when Ferdinand sent secretly a delegate to treat with the Turks in December 1912, behind the backs of the Government and without consulting it.[1] He did nothing to bridle the warlike incitings of Ferdinand to prolong the war with Turkey even when Rumania was threatening to invade Bulgaria. On December 28 1912 Ferdinand grandiloquently declared to his ministers: "the threats of Rumania may frighten you, but not me . . . salvation lies in our renewing military operations against Turkey", etc. All this proves that the Ministers were mere puppets in Ferdinand's hands. Even the quiescence of Gueshov did not suffice to placate Ferdinand and was tolerated only up to a certain time.

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[1] Prince Nicolas of Greece who is a confirmed adversary of Venizelos wrote in his "My fifty Years": The intolerable arrogance of Bulgarian pretentions, experienced by Greece and Serbia, brought about as a natural consequence a closer understanding between Greece aud Serbia, and these cordial relations grew stronger as the Bulgarian attitude grew more agressive. Baluktsitch (the Serbian Minister in Athens) came to see me and stated the necessity of an alliance. When Venizelos returned from London he was painfully surprised. Though desiring to ward off a rupture he was averse to any secret intelligence with Serbia and was disposed to make all kinds of concessions to Bulgaria in the hope of appeasing her insatiable demands. Venizelos had shown considerable reluctance to the idea of a secret alliance with Serbia; his one desire was that of maintaining at all costs a permanent Balkan coalition". p. p. 236—244.

When he could not be coerced into emitting more strident war cries in harmony with the diapason adopted by the military orchestra under the command of the Tsar of the Bulgarians, the latter and General Savov intimated to Gueshov that he had better get out of the way and make room for an instrument capable of vibrating in response to the tunes emitted by them. Gueshov retired without uttering a warning or a protest, apparently pleased at being relieved of such responsibilities for which he was obviously not cut out, and with the advent of Danev, whose intractability and pig-headedness have seldom been equalled, every moderating influence in Bulgaria disappeared. The perusal of the books [1] which best describe how Bulgaria was driven into the maelstrom of the second Balkan war under the direction imparted to her policy by her maleficent ruler and his crew of hellhags, makes exceedingly sad reading. Such utter lack of αἰδώς (moderation), and consideration for the feelings, claims, and rights of other men, such ὕβρις (arrogance) was bound to bring on the inevitable νέμεσις (retribution) and the denouement was a tragedy worthy of Aeschylus and his immoral theology, for the ire of the Gods vented itself on the innocent, while the culprits escaped scatheless in order to repeat their sinister exploits. Hardly had Danev been nominated as Premier on June 2, than he started bombarding the Russian Government with his impudent notes:

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[1] It would appear that Ferdinand offered to sign an alliance with Turkey in order to chain down the Serbs, and this was mentioned by the German Emperor in a telegram to the German Foreign Office.

> "The full application of the Treaty by Serbia is the sole means of avoiding war". "If Serbia does not accept the Treaty, war is inevitable". "If Russia does not force Serbia to accept the terms of the Treaty, Bulgaria declines all responsibility for the consequences".

The culminating point of this spate of insolence was reached on June 22 when the Tsar of Russia was informed that he was given seven days within which to issue his arbitral decision. Dr. A. Ghirghinov in his "National Catastrophe", p. 352—366 unequivocally recounts how the attack of June 29 which precipitated the second Balkan war, was staged. It was an effort to "Copenhagen" the Serbian and Greek armies, somewhat after the manner Canning dealt with the Danish fleet in 1807. A paralysing blow was to be dealt simultaneously at both the adver-

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[1] Peter Todorov's: The Pogroms of Bulgaria.— Dr. Alexander Ghirghinov's: The National Catastrophe, — V. T. Veltchev's: Towards the Pogrom.

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saries and certain strategical points seized on the very day the Tsar of Russia was timed to issue his verdict which naturally would be influenced thereby, but if contrary to expectations, the award had gone against Bulgaria, then the situation created would be such that she could dispense with the necessity of bowing to an unfavourable decision. On June 28, Danev was still undecided as to his going to St. Petersburgh. On the 30th, he handed the Bulgarian memoir to Nekludov, the Russian Minister in Sofia, with the request that it be forwarded at the earliest, and made it known that he was ready to leave for Russia on the following day. This was wired to the Bulgarian Legations in Paris, London, Vienna, Berlin and St. Petersburgh. It was a diplomatic move to mask Danev's real intentions and minimise his responsibilities for the starting of military operations. The order to begin the attack was issued on June 28 with the consent of the Cabinet, otherwise Danev's change of view within two days concerning his visiting St. Petersburgh is incomprehensible. He only decided to go when he had made sure that the attack had been launched, and that the successes he was discounting would force the Tsar of Russia to support Bulgaria's standpoint. For this reason the Cabinet, which knew what was going on took no action when the Greek and Serbian verbal notes of protest against the Bulgarian attack were delivered to it on June 30, and it was only on the following day when it was advised that the 4th Bulgarian army did not attain its objectives that it took notice of them. Dr. Ghirginov depicts how Danev spent the day of June 30 in hiding a few miles out of Sofia at the headquartes of the 3rd army corps.

* Danev entered the office of General Dimitriev where Colonel Jostov was also present, smiling and exclaimed: 'Be glad, the advance has started this morning, and in two days I shall accompany Tsar Ferdinand to Salonica. There, let the Greek and Serbian Pre-

> **miers come and meet me, instead of their dragging me to Petersburgh ... I have come here, because I am hiding to day from the representatives of the foreign Powers, because we wish to deceive them and make them believe that we did not start a war against the Greeks and Serbians, and that it was the commander-in-chief who began it without the consent of the Government".**

There were no divergences between the views of General Savov and those of the Cabinet, for on July 1 the latter wired to Savov in most polite terms, instructing him to stop the military operations without addressing him a single word of reprimand. .The Bulgarian Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry, in spite of its desire to whitewash the responsible persons, had to conclude that the fatal order to attack was issued *Not without the knowledge of Danev.* General Savov testified that Ferdinand had commanded him to order the attack, and as the latter was, according to the Constitution, irresponsible, no one was prosecuted. It must not be thought that the wily Ferdinand embarked on this adventure without having received certain assurances and encouragements from Austria. General Savov affirmed to Von Mach, (Op. cit. p. 235) that Ferdinand had assured him that as soon as Bulgaria declared war on Serbia, an Austrian army corps would cross the Danube into Serbia. This is why Ferdinand made light of the Rumanian threat of invasion, and scoffingly remarked to his ministers "this may frighten you, but not me". Nor should it be forgotten that on the eve of the second Balkan war the Hungarian premier, Count Tisza, declared that Austria-Hungary stood for the independence of the Balkan States, that they were "free to choose their own methods of settling their differences and that no other State would be allowed to acquire special prerogatives in the Balkans". This resounding speech further confirmed the warlike in their decision to have recourse to the sword. M. P. Todorov, in his "The Pogroms of Bulgaria vol. I p. 182/3, narrates at length the efforts of Austria[1] to convince the Bulgarian Cabinet that she would support the Bulgarian claim to Salonica, that Rumania would take up a friendly position, that in case of a conflict with Serbia some 50,000 Albanians would invade the latter country and that if Bulgaria showed herself disposed to cede Ochrida and Struga to Serbia, Austria would proceed to include them in Albania. On June 28, Tochev, the Bulgarian ambassador at Vienna wired to his government: „From a most authoritative source I learn that Rumania will not mobilise against Bulgaria nor will she act conjointly with Serbia and Greece against Bulgaria“. That Austria was premeditating an attack on Serbia conjointly with Bulgaria becomes evident from San Giuliano's (the Italian foreign Minister) telegram to Giolitti, the Prime Minister, who was absent at the time from Rome. „Austria has informed us and Germany of her intention to take action against Serbia and describes it as defensive, hoping to establish the *casus foederis,* which I consider inapplicable I am trying to concert with Germany to prevent this action“. etc.

When Austria perceived that her allies were not supporting her she was obliged to postpone her reckoning with Serbia and could not do otherwise than leave Bulgaria in the lurch That Bulgaria was following the bid of Austria had become evident from the arrogant demeanour of the upstart Danev, for obviously he was not of the stuff to hold such provocative language to

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[1] „Shortly before resigning, Gueshov sounded the Austrian Minister in Sofia, Count Tarnowski, as to what would be Austria's attitude in case of a conflict breaking out between Bulgaria and Serbia. On June 2 the same question was put to the Minister. Tarnowski read a report from Vienna according to which Austria would support Bulgaria to take all lands in Macedonia, but that she should come to an understanding with Rumania, For some of our responsible governing circles this assurance was sufficient“, (op. cit. vol. II p. 91),

● 648 Russia if he felt himself unsupported, and Sazonov readily sensed this when he replied on June 25 to Bobtchev, the Bulgarian Minister in St. Petersburgh:

> „You are following Austria's counsels, you are free ... The Emperor did not expect an ultimatum as to a time limit in his decision in the dispute. After your declaration, expect nothing from us, forget that some responsibility may devolve on us through the Treaty of 1902".

In fact Russia had clearly intimated to Bulgaria as late as June 24, that she would not arbitrate in the Bulgaro-Serbian dispute so long as Bulgaria refused to submit to arbitration her difference with Greece (Russian Orange Book, document No. 251). Danev as late as June 28 wired to Bobtchev: „I shall negotiate alone if I come. Please do not talk of any arbitration concerning Greece." This shows that Danev had never accepted Russia's conditions and that he was playing for time. In fact the Bulgarian Cabinet had agreed on June 22 that it would accept Russian arbitration provided the Tsar agreed to issue his verdict by June 29, and within the stipulations of the Bulgaro-Serbian Treaty, and these conditions Russia declined to comply with, so that Gueshov's contention that Bulgaria had accepted the arbitration of the Tsar of Russia can not be upheld. Events would certainly have taken another turn if the arbitrator had been a more energetic person that the late Tsar Nicolas II and if he had interceded firmly and not allowed the quarrel to drag on and become envenomed.

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In a public lecture delivered in Sofia on April 23, 1933, General Kovatchev, the commander of the 4th Bulgarian army, which attacked the Serbians on June 29, 1913, gave some striking details which illustrate the morbid ambition which haunted Ferdinand concerning Constantinople, his abnormal treatment of his subordinates, and a narrative of the events which led to the issuing of the

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fatal order to attack Though his version does not agree in all particulars with others. General Kovatchev also concluded that Danev was bound to know of what was brewing. The lecture may be summarised as follows:

The General began by narrating how Ferdinand attempted to excite the anger of the officer corps against Russia, presenting the latter as the sole obstacle to Bulgaria's securing an outlet on the sea of Marmara. In an interview which Kovatchev had on February 8, 1913, Ferdinand complained to him of Generals Savov, Nikiforov and Fitchev and made most disparaging remarks about them. At a Cabinet meeting held after the Easter holidays, all the army commanders save Fitchev expressed the opinion that the Bulgarian army was in a position to wage war on Serbia and Greece, and that while Gueshov's partisans were for a peaceful solution, Danev's supporters were warlike. General Savov related to the speaker that the conflict which arose between him and Tsar Ferdinand was due to the latter's resolve not to end the war without securing Rodosto on the Marmara Ferdinand ordered him on April 8 to write to the Prime Minister, Gueshov, in the name of the army, that it refused to conclude peace until the above object had been attained. Savov answered that he could not agree to this demand and expose the army's prestige needlessly. Ferdinand reiterated his demand which Savov again categorically rejected, whereupon Ferdinand convoked him in his presence and began reprobating him for his insubordination reviling him and accusing him of ingratitude, since he had taken him out of the dock and placed him in this high post, and instead of showing gratitude, he was discrediting him in the eyes of the army. This flow of invective put Savov out of humour and he coolly replied that when he would be tried he would not hesitate to unravel matters which would clearly reveal who of the two was responsible for the misdeeds which were being ascribed to him, after which Savov bowed and withdrew. Kovatsev met Savov again on May 31 and was told that the army was now being moved to the west in order to impress Russia, France and England into coercing Serbia to accept the Treaty stipulations, as these three Powers were most anxious to maintain the Balkan Alliance. Concerning the issuing of the order to attack, General Kovatsev affirms that both Ferdinand and Savov did not want to provoke war, but that they were seeking to impress not only the Serbians and Greeks, but also the Tsar of Russia, in order that the latter might arbitrate in favour of Bulgaria. Savov had not informed Danev of the intended attack, but he supposed that

Tsar Ferdinand had done so. Savov could hardly assume that th two had not acted in concert, for Danev was kept imformed of matters of even a more delicate nature, so that he could not be igno rant of what was happening, since Palace circles were cognisant, an they would have reported it to him. Another proof that Danev wa acquainted with what was occurring, was the telegrams which he addressed on the morning of June 30 to the Bulgarian representatives abroad to the effect that the attack had been started by the Serbians and Greeks and not by the Bulgarians, and secondly the orde Danev transmitted simultaneously to the military censors to preven the publication of any news concerning what was happening at th front.

When the attack miscarried, the Cabinet attempted t disculpate itself by showing that it knew nothing of the attack. After consulting with the Russian Minister i Sofia, it ordered the suspension of hostilities, withou making sure whether the Serbian and Greek armies woul condescend to do likewise. Russia promised to put a sto to the fratricidal war if Bulgaria would accept the territor between the Bregalnitsa and Vardar, the Belassitsa Mountain and the Struma, with the towns of Kotshana, Radovitc Pehtsevo, Drama, Cavalla and possibly Serres, but Dane refused and resigned, declaring that „his po[illegible] had gon bankrupt". His resignation and the advent [illegible] Austrophile Cabinet of Radoslavov brought about the failure o Russia's effort to help Bulgaria out of the mess she ha got in. Tsar Ferdinand immediately suspended Genera Savov from his functions for having obeyed the injunction of the Government. The Serbians who were so lon spoiling for a fight, now that they had been offered an excellent justification for doing so [1] rejected all offers fo an armistice, and turned a deaf ear to Russia's injunctions 648 counterattacked the Bulgarians who had been ordered to 721 cease fighting and badly mauled them. It took some time for the Bulgarian army to recover from these initial rebuffs, but in a few weeks under the able leadership of general R. Dimitriev, the situation had been retrieved. The Bulgarians were advancing on Nisch and threatening to cut the communications of the Serbian army in Macedonia, while the Greek army seemed as if it would suffer a Sedan in the Kresna defile but all these efforts of the troops were unavailing. The Rumanian army unrestrained by Russia, which could not allow Serbia to be crushed, had invaded Bulgaria and was advancing unopposed on Sofia, while Turkey, following the example set by Rumania, reoccupied Adrianople. Bulgaria was forced to capitulate and throw herself on the mercy of her vindictive enemies.

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[1] The Serbian military circles had formally declared to th Serbian Government that they had definitely resolved to retain th lands they occupied and that they would not yield them up. Proclamations declaring war on Bulgaria in which the date was lef blank were seized on Serbian prisoners and this shows that th Serbians were contemplating to declare war on Bulgaria and wer waiting for a favourable occasion; the Bulgarians merely forestalle

By the ensuing Treaty of Bucarest signed on August 728 10, Bulgaria was deprived of all share in Macedonia save the upper part of the valley of the river Struma, and received as her share of the spoils wrung from Turkey, a short stretch of coast line of the Aegean, between the rivers Mesta and Maritsa with its hinterland, the mountainous region of the Rhodopes. She was obliged to cede to Rumania the whole of the southern Dobrudja in spite of the fact that this region of 7609 sq. klm. with a population of 290000 souls contained only 2.2% of Rumanians One would have expected that both the Balkan States and the Great Powers would have at least exerted themselves a little in order to secure for Bulgaria that part of Thrace up

an attack on their allies. Sazonov in his „Fateful Years", p. 95, admits that it was Russia who prevented Serbia from opening hostilities: ‚The army was confident of success. I replied that I did not consider myself in a position to offer strategic advice, but from a political no less than a moral point of view.such a policy would cause irreparable damage to Serbia, damage for which no military success could compensate her.

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bly, in order to win the goodwill of Turkey, advised in August 1913 the Turkish representative at Berne that it would be politic to take advantage of Bulgaria's difficulties in order to expel from Thrace the Bulgarian element which would always be a menace to the retention of this province by Turkey. This „humane" advice was communicated in code from Berne on August 21 to the Grand Vizier, Said Halil, and promptly acted upon; a large section of the Bulgarian population being uprooted and driven out from Eastern Thrace into Bulgaria. 728

The indifference shown by her former Allies and the Powers of the Entente for Bulgaria's rights in Thrace, constrained her to come to terms with Turkey and even to begin negotiations with her for the conclusion of a treaty of alliance, the object of which was to attack Greece. In the autumn of 1913 General Savov was dispatched to Constantinople to conduct these negotiations and arrive at an arrangement concerning the delimitation of the Bulgaro-Turkish frontier. It may be affirmed that the disregard of Bulgaria's rights in Thrace imparted the first impetus to the policy of collaboration between Bulgaria and Turkey. Had Russia, on the other hand been supported in her attempt to champion Bulgaria's claims against Turkey, it is certain that there would have been little cause for Bulgaria being drawn into Turkey's orbit, which paved the way for her adhesion to the Central Alliance. 648 ●

Tsar Ferdinand hastened to replace Danev by Radoslavov, supported by Tontchev and Ghenadiev. Radoslavov on June 22 had convoked a big public meeting, which passed a resolution in favour of declaring war on Serbia

Greece", also refers to „the mischievous tendency to distortion which characterised that gentleman". p. 103. The advice Politis so readily proffered to Turkey, was acted upon not only in connection with the Bulgarians, but later also with regards the Greeks, and Greece has to a certain extent to thank Politis for the million and a half of hapless refugees who were dumped a few years later on her soil.

and Greece. These three politicians, in an open letter dated July 5, 1913, addressed to Ferdinand, had declared: „We think to-day, as we thought then. that the salvation of our State can only be found in a policy of intimate friendship with Austria-Hungary" This was a clear avowal that Bulgaria would henceforth pursue an Austrophile policy. This was rendered possible by the lack of coherence among the remaining political parties, which at that critical moment declined to sink their differences and impose on Ferdinand a national policy

## THE WORLD WAR

The mischievous and equivocal declaration made by Danev on resigning, namely „that our policy has gone bankrupt" was interpreted by all in Bulgaria as a public avowal that the friendliness displayed to Russia was the cause of the disaster which befell Bulgaria. Such a statement coming from the leader of the most Russophile party in the country helped to lend colour to the insinuations circulated by the circles devoted to Tsar Ferdinand, to the effect that Russia had sought to thwart the realisation of Bulgaria's aspirations. Danev's policy, it is true, had failed disastrously, but the cause was that he had swerved from the Russophile policy he had always declared to have pursued. This deviation, however, he would not acknowledge, as it implied his assumption of a great share in Bulgaria's catastrophe. In order to exculpate himself, he preferred to throw the onus of the disaster on the pro-Russian policy which he pretended to have followed devotedly. This pusillanimous attitude helped to intensify the eclipse which the Russophile elements suffered after the Balkan wars, and facilitated Tsar Ferdinand's task of maintaining in power the Radoslavov Cabinet, composed of some of the

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worst blackguards Bulgaria had produced. This Ministry was entirely out of sympathy with the nation, and in spite of all the terrorism it exerted repeatedly at the elections, was unable to secure a majority at the polls. Thus at the elections, which took place in December 1913, the votes cast for the Government and the Opposition numbered respectively 202,363 and 329,320. Unfortunately the Opposition was divided into seven antagonistic groups and was unable to impose itself, in spite of the fact that it had 110 deputies against 94 belonging to the Government in the Sobranye. Radoslavov took advantage to dissolve the Chamber and to hold fresh elections early in March 1914, after having recourse to an artifice, that of extending the franchise to the inhabitants of the territories allocated to Bulgaria at the conclusion of the Balkan wars This was a clear infringement of the Constitution, for the incorporation of this territory had not yet been voted by the Legislative Assembly. This stratagem permitted Radoslavov's supporters to secure the return of 126 deputies to the new Sobranye, while the Opposition deputies numbered only 119, though the votes cast were 345,730 for the Governent and 418,058 for the Opposition. Among the Goverment deputies were forty Moslems, thirteen of whom had been returned from the newly annexed territories in Thrace and who were subservient tools of the Young Turkish party holding power in Constantinople, and who naturally were able to exert their influence on Radoslavov and impose on him the adoption of a pro-Turkish attitude. The conclusion of a loan in Germany, further strengthened the ascendancy the Austro-Germans were beginning to exert, and though it has been repeatedly asseverated that no political clauses were attached to the conclusion of the loan, yet it may be assumed that certain tacit assurances were given. This is corroborated by a statement made by von Tschirsky to the Bulgarian Ambassador in

648 Vienna, which is recorded in the Bulgarian Orange Book (Document 735): „Even when the loan was advanced to you, it was understood that your policy would assume an unhesitating course". A similar affirmation is ascribed to Radoslavov who assured the German ambassador in Sofia on July 15, 1914, after the voting of the loan, that the Cabinet felt itself secure and that it would begin to plan Bulgaria's attachment to the Triple Alliance. („Kautsky's documents vol I. p. 162). While Peter Todorov affirms:

> „The political character of the financial assistance secured from German capital is emphasized by the instructions sent by our Finance Minister when he directed our Minister in Vienna (in 1913) to request the Austrian Banks not to charge more that 8% interest because the service rendered was also of a political character". (op. cit. vol II p. 229).

The new Chamber[1] hastened to appoint a Parliamentary commission to inquire into the activities of the Gueshov and Danev Cabinets. The government accused them of being responsible of the misfortunes which befell Bulgaria in the late wars This was clearly a clever ruse of Radoslavov aimed at discrediting his political opponents and curtailing their activities, for he himself being devoid of all popular support, was fearful lest his opponents by arousing the slumbering consciousness of the nation should come to dislodge him from office in which he was maintaining himself uniquely with the patronage of the Crown. Radoslavov was not even sure of all his supporters. The Stambulovists, comprising 28 deputies, and the second group in numbers supporting the Goverment, was headed by Ghenadiev, one of the most clever and unscrupulous politicians Bulgaria has had, who was playing a double game. The Stambulovists had been indicted for a series of illegalities committed by them while in office during the period 1903—8, and were awaiting trial. Radoslavov, whenever Ghenadiev showed any sign of resisting the pro-German policy which was being foisted on the Bul-

[1] Elected in December 1913, see col. [illegible]

661 throne lay in sowing discord among his subjects, and he devoted himself wholeheartedly to achieve this aim by encouraging mutual distrust and enmity both in political and military circles. He incited General Fitchev to murder General Savov, he upbraided Minister Ghenadiev for not permitting the murder of Minister T. Todorov, while he condemned the war Minister K. Naidenov for not arranging the assassination of Ghenadiev. (Protocols of 648 State Trials pp. 596-601-979) While he[*] thus set his politicians and officers by the ears, he applied himself to come to a close understanding with the Central Empires, these being the sole Powers which would condescend to support him in his morbid desire to wreak vengeance on Serbia and Russia, which in his imagination had dared interfere with the realisation of his ambitious aims. During the prolonged stay he made in Austria-Hungary in the autumn of 1913, it seems that the Emperor Francis-Joseph must have given him assurances that he would soon have an opportunity of retrieving his ill-luck. Ferdinand in exchange pledged himself to support the policy of the Central Powers. This accounts for his determination to persist in the pro-Austrian policy he had initiated, and in maintaining the Radoslavov Cabinet, the only one amenable to such a course, in spite of the repeated rebuffs it suffered when the electorate was consulted. On March 1, 1929, the *Mir* published an article signed by I. St. Gueshov, a former Bulgarian diplomat, who affirmed that in the autumn of 1913 Ferdinand at Vienna, and General Savov and Natsevitch at Constantinople, had promised Francis-Joseph, and the Grand Vizier, that whatever would happen, Bulgaria would support the Central Powers and Turkey, and Gueshov even affirms that draft treaties to this effect were signed. That the Emperor of Austria fully relied on these promises of Tsar Ferdinand becomes obvious from the handwritten letter the former addressed to the Kaiser

[*] [i.e. Tsar Ferdinand — Analyst]

on July 4. 1914. and which he entrusted to Count Hoyos to convey to Germany. In it an important role was assigned to Bulgaria as a thoroughly reliable element in the impending struggle with Serbia[1]. (Austro-Hungarian Diplomatic Documents 1919 № 1) As soon as Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, the Emperor called upon Ferdinand to co-operate at once with him as if he were a trusty ally, and Ferdinand hastened to instruct Radoslavov to begin negotiations for the conclusion of an alliance with the Central Empires, as is confirmed by a report addressed to the German Government by the German Minister in Sofia on August 2, 1914. (Die deutschen dokumente zum Kriegsansbruch Vol. III and IV Nos. 673 and 697) These negotiations were pursued and Bulgaria given a free hand to annex all territory she claimed from those of her neighbours who had not adhered to the Central Alliance; while Radoslavov and his colleague Tontchev, gave assurances that Bulgaria would not undertake anything against Rumania if the latter performed her duty to her allies. (Kautsky's Diplomatic Documents Vol. III. pp. 55 & 143) On October 9, 1914, Radoslavov sounded the War Minister, Fitchev, as to the conclusion of a military convention which was to complete the Treaty of Alliance, and a few weeks later Ferdinand hinted to the same person that he ought to learn German because Bulgaria's place was with the Central Alliance. (Protocols of the State Trial of the Radoslavov Cabinet p. 453.) The reason why Bulgaria was not involved in the struggle at that early date may be inferred from a telegram addressed by Radoslavov to the

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[1] The following passage from it is indicative of the reliance Austria placed in the Radoslavov Cabinet: „The efforts of my Government must in future be directed towards the isolation and diminution of Serbia. The first step in this direction should be to strengthen the position of the present Bulgarian Government, in order that Bulgaria whose real interests are identical with our own. may be preserved from a relapse into a Russophile policy".

648 Bulgarian Minister in Berlin in December 1914. (Bulgarian Orange Book, Document No. 593)...

> „It is not yet time for Bulgaria to infringe her neutrality, because materially she is weak, and also because our military supplies are not being delivered, even Austria-Hungary having placed an embargo on our rifles. Greece and Rumania, as in 1913, are awaiting our intervention in order to attack us".

Though no formal alliance was signed until September 6, 1915, Bulgaria's adhesion to the Central Alliance was a foregone conclusion, and this is confirmed by her Government's divergent attitude towards each of the two groups of Powers. While everything was done to facilitate the passage through Bulgarian territory of army supplies destined to Turkey, Russian requests for dispatching help to Serbia through Bulgaria were rejected on the plea that they would constitute an infringement of Bulgarian neutrality. The protocols of the State Trial of the Radoslavov Cabinet abound with evidence as to the systematic smuggling through of armaments to Turkey. The act of accusation itself cites an official letter of Radoslavov in which he affirms that at the beginning of 1915 relations between Turkey and Bulgaria were not only friendly but those of two allies. Richard Von Mach in his „Aus Bewegter Balkanzeit", affirms that these States had bound themselves to assist each other against an attack by any Balkan State, on August 1914. And minister Pechev in his diary, notes, August 7, 1914:

> „My colleagues remained in the Ministerial Council until after 1. a, m. and together with Talat and Halil Bey signed a treaty between Bulgaria and Turkey".

Diplomatist of the Central Alliance in their conversations with their Bulgarian colleagues refer to a concluded pact between their respective countries, much to the surprise of the latter who ignore, or pretend to be ignorant of it. (Bulgarian Orange Book. vol. I. Documents 772, 782, 799, 860, 998) Both Ferdinand and Radoslavov did their utmost to withhold from the public all knowledge of the contents of the offers the Entente Powers were making, while they persistently magnified any corresponding offer the Central Powers would put forth.

In spite of the pro-Russian feelings of the masses, which Savinsky, the Russian Minister in Sofia repeatedly alludes to in his „Recollections of a Russian Diplomat", pp. 203 and 250, the national will remained voiceless, for the political parties, the function of which was to give expression to it, were too disunited and too absorbed in the campaign they were conducting of mutual recrimination and vituperation. Whatever a politically untrained community could do[1] to prevent itself being drawn into a struggle against its will, appears to have been accomplished, but the masses, devoid of capable leaders and receiving no outside support, had to bow down before the organised forces of the State and follow meekly along the path that was being traced for them. Only on one occasion did Bulgaria's rulers vacillate in their resolution to side with Germany, and that was in the spring of 1915, when there was a fair prospect of the Dardanelles being forced, and when the Russian successes in Galicia made even the most Germanophile among them begin to entertain serious doubts as to the invincibility of the Central Powers. At that crucial moment Radoslavov intimated unequivocally to Savinsky that Bulgaria would side with the Entente if she were aided in taking this step.

„I sent to Sazonov a personal telegram on April 7, stating: Radoslavov assures me he was only waiting for a favourable moment to join in with Russia.... he then gave me to understand that he

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[1] For a fuller narrative of the events leading up to Bulgaria's intervention in the World War and after, see the writer's, „Bulgaria, problems and politics", and his contribution to „Bulgaria and Rumania", in the Series of the „Nations of To.Day", published by *Hodder and Stoughton.*

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would prefer Bulgaria to be forced into action and the Government to be placed before an accomplished fact. Seeing what he was driving at, I asked him what the Bulgarian Government's answer would be if a definite reply-„yes or no" was now demanded from them by the Allies? To this he said that he would answer 'yes'. I then asked him to what extent the words of his brother-in-law, (a member of the National Assembly) had been correctly reported to me. namely, that if the Russians landed on the Black Sea coast .and the French and British at Dede-Agatch, Bulgaria would immedietely join them? To that Radoslavov answered: „Two landings would be unnecessary, the Russian landing should suffice. Knowing it was not directed against us, we would accept it gladly and leave the details to be settled later on of a common accord.'" (Recollections of a Russian Diplomat. Op. cit. p. 259/61).

What was most symptomatic was that Ferdinand repeatedly dispatched his private secretary and Count Marshal to affirm to Savinsky that „Bulgaria was only waiting for the moment she could repay to Russia her debt of gratitude". The Russian Minister further wrote:

> „Seeing the reversal of attitude that had taken place both in the Palace and in Government spheres, I telegraphed to Sazonov on April 10, that just now we have reached the psychological moment when it is necessary to act,,.. I believe that further hasitation might be dangerous to success... the position of the King and of the Government would be made easier by the accomplished fact, whereas the people and the army would enthusiastically hail the appearance of Russian uniforms. The presence of a comparatively small contingent would draw out the whole country against Turkey". etc. Op. Cit.).

Unfortunately Savinsky's recommendations were not followed. Sazonov at the prompting of his western Allies requested his Minister in a telegram dated April 20, to shut off steam: „Conforming to the desire of Delcassé refrain from the prescribed action pending further instructions".

At that critical period Radoslavov even approached the late Mr. Bourchier and commissioned him to transmit to the British Foreign office an offer for Bulgaria's co-ope-

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ration on terms remarkable for their moderation. The draft of this telegram was published in Lady Grogan's „The Life J. D. Bourchier", p. 165:

> „If three Powers give mandate Bulgaria occupation Serbian Macedonia to line treaty 1912 with guarantee against molestation part Rumania Greece Bulgarian premier declares Bulgaria would place forces our disposal would acquiesce similar guarantees to Rumania Greece (against Bulgarian aggression) thus liberating respectively Rumania for invasion Transylvania Greece for operations Asia Minor".

Instead of taking the bull by the horns however, the propitious moments were allowed to pass by irremediably:

> „Entente diplomacy was placing great hopes on the impending Italian intervention and on the success of the Dardanelles campaign. Under these circumstances it felt in a position to dispense with the help of the Balkan States, and accordingly treated them with scant courtesy. The prospect of acting without the co-operation of these greedy, clamorous, intemperate, would-be customers must certainly have proved alluring to many politicians". (the writer's „Bulgaria, problems and Politics", p. 117.)

According to an article which appeared in the *Revue de France* (September 15. 1933) „L'intervention Bulgare dans la Grande Guérre" Russia had decided to land troops at Burgas, this plan having been approved by Sazonov and Delcassé, but Sir Edward Grey expressed himself on March 19, 1915, that this was undesirable without Bulgaria's explicit consent, and that Sir Edward persisted in his opposition even when Radoslavov had declared to the Russian ambassador in Sofia that Bulgaria would close her eyes to such action. The attitude of Sir Edward at this period is indefensible, his angle of vision must have been utterly distorted if he came to consider that it did not matter substantially on which side Bulgaria threw her weight. And to all appearance he displayed supreme indifference for Bulgaria when she came knocking at our door. A few phrases from the note he transmitted to Sofia

•648 on April 15 1915 (Bulgarian Orange Book vol. I No. 801) could hardly be surpassed in effectiveness as a damper:

> „Le Gouvernement Britannique avait reçu des indications que Sa Majesté Ferdinand regardait la Triple Entente avec malveillance et il ne pouvait ni inviter le concours de la Bulgarie ni formuler des offres précises avant de recevoir une assurance définitive que le roi des Bulgares et le Gouvernement bulgare étaient prêts à s'allier avec la Triple Entente sous des conditions raisonnables."

The Bulgarian Minister in London having expressed certain apprehensions as to an eventual hostile attitude of Greece and Rumania towards Bulgaria, Sir Edward concluded his dispatch with this patronising assurance:

> „L'Angleterre désirait une entente balkanique: elle ne désirait pas une nouvelle guèrre balkanique. Tant que le Gouvernement bulgare se montrerait bien disposé envers l'Angleterre, le Gouvernement Britannique refuserait de s'associer à des dispositions hostiles à la Bulgarie".

Prior to the receipt of this impressive diplomatic missive, Ferdinand had sent an autograph letter to King George, probably in order to confirm Radoslavov's overtures, but according to Dr. Seton Watson, it was not answered, and the distinguished historian appositely depicts what ensued by remarking:

> „For the next six months Sir Edward Grey played with the idea of a Serbo-Bulgarian Agreement; and after the Russian retreat and the Suvla Bay disasters, the Bulgarians responded by playing with Sir Edward Grey". (Europe in the Melting pot. 110).

It was a great misfortune for Great Britain that at this critical period of the war her Foreign Secretary should have been so ill advised as to have deliberately cold-shouldered both Bulgaria and Greece when they were most anxious to join us, and from prospective willing allies to have turned them into open or covert enemies. When reading Sir Edward's „Twenty five Years", a student of history is astounded at the lameness of the defence he puts in for his policy towards these two States. (Vol. II pp. 172 and 197) and marvels at the utter ignorance of local conditions which he displays. A Minister of Foreign Affairs should know better than affirm that:

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> „Bulgaria had in 1913... been deprived of any outlet on the Aegean", (vol. II p. 174). „Bulgaria wanted a port on the Aegean and her claims in Macedonia". (vol. II p. 194).

For Bulgaria had a stretch of coast line on the Aegean at the time. One however, can not help admiring Sir Edward's frankness when he proceeds to admit that the inducements offered to Bulgaria at a later period for her participation in the war on our side were inadequate:

> „The utmost, then, that we could say to Bulgaria was, that if it came to be in our power to win great gains for Serbia, we should make it a condition of her acquiring those gains that she should concede what we thought fair claims of Bulgaria. This still left it open to Serbia to say that she would rather not have the new gains that give up Monastir". Vol. II p, 197.

Serbian intractability, however, to which allusion is made in the above text should to a large measure be ascribed to the concessions which were being made to Italy at the time. Lloyd George in his „War Memoirs" Vol. I p. 400 cites a letter of Mr. George Trevelyan dated Sofia Jan. 15 1915, in which that eminent historian affirms:

> „In general, however, we can say from numerous conversations with Serbians from the Crown Prince downwards that the more Yugoslavia and Adriatic expansion are dwelt upon the more Serbians will be willing to concede to (in ?) Macedonia".

An Sazonov likewise. wrote on the subject in his „Fateful Years". p. 264:

> „It cost me a great effort to sacrifice to the advantage of the Italian Alliance the interest of the Serbian people, whose desires could be realised only through the Great War. Serbia would, in any case have an outlet to the sea, but a considerable part of the Serbian population would be excluded from their own country"

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## BULGARIA-PAST & PRESENT

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Had the Entente, early in 1915 attempted to win over Bulgaria and even Greece instead of Italy, it would have found that this could have been done with less concessions, fewer difficulties, and incomparably more conclusive results. Within a week of its conclusion, the Treaty of London, signed on April 28 1915 became known to the Serbians, and they were justly furious at the transfer of Jugoslav territory behind their backs. M. Passitch declared that Serbians were being treated worse than Africans.

The coolness with which the Bulgarian advances were received in London confirmed the Bulgarians in their doubts as to our sincerity concerning our alleged readiness to award Constantinople and the Straits to Russia. They came to infer that our aloofness was dictated by duplicity, and that secretly we were doing our level best to prevent such a consummation, and that we really did not wish to see them intervene on our side. This view probably gained ground also through the attitude of our official representative, Sir Henry Bax-Ironside, of whom Lieut. Colonel the Hon. H. D. Napier wrote in his „Experiences of a Military Attache in the Balkans" (p. 28): „was of opinion at this time that it was not only impossible but also undesirable to win her (Bulgaria) over to our side." Minister Pechev, the only honest person in the Radoslavov Ministry, has two entries in his diary concerning Sir Henry Bax-Ironside, which throw much light on the mentality of Bulgarian official circles and which permit us to grasp the beliefs they were then entertaining about British official policy, February 4 (O. S.) 1915:

> „Bax-Ironside stated to Radoslavov that Sir Edward Grey was content with Bulgarian neutrality, and he added that personally he considered that Bulgaria should not let herself be influenced by advice emanating from Russia and France aiming at involving her in the war".

## THE WORLD WAR

June 26, (O. S.) 1915: „Bax-Ironside leaves for England. After expressing several times England's desire to see Bulgaria participate in the war, he privately, and intimately spoke to Radoslavov that Bulgaria did well to remain neutral. He gave the same advice to Agrarian deputies who came to visit him".[1]

From this it was easy for the Bulgarians to infer that so far as England was concerned, Byron's exhortations still held good: —

> „Better still serve the haughty Mussulman.
> Than swell the Cosaque's prowling caravan;"

The Bulgarians who had seen their country dismemberd in 1878 at the instigation of Great Britain, in order that Russia might not secure an outpost towards Constantinople, could not come to believe that in 1915 England would so completely alter her point of view as to permit and even facilitate her rival's instalment at such a post of vantage. Even the failure of the Dardanelles expedition was not interpreted as such in Bulgaria, and to-day there are intelligent Bulgarians who still uphold that it was a staged up affair and that the British really never seriously tried to force the Straits, because they did not wish to hand them over to Russia.[2]

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[1] Madol in his „Ferdinand of Bulgaria" p. 285 writes: „Ironside feared Anglo-Russian complications on account of Constantinople if the Bulgarians were to aid in the conquest of Turkey. Thus to the surprise of Radoslavov, Ironside advised him, when the Entente issued their ultimatum to Bulgaria, not to make a rash decision as no one could foretell the issue of the war; he added that Bulgaria was not in a fit state to undertake a war. Radoslavov, who was unable to explain the Briton's visit, consulted the leaders of the Opposition. The latter mobilised the French and Russian representatives who protested against Ironside's action, and obtained his recall. Whether Ironside's attitude has been dictated by Downing Street or not, this incident shows the nature of British thoughts and misgivings with regard to Constantinople".

[2] It seems strange, but the attitude of certain British circles towards Turkey during the war had something mysterious about it.

BULGARIA-PAST & PRESENT

This conviction which was largely held in Bulgaria, and which we were unable to shake subsequently, when we started rather late in the day to win over Bulgaria with offers, explains how we helped to pour grist into Ferdinand's mill and facilitate his task of involving his country on the side of Germany. Far from being justified in charging Bulgaria with duplicity, as some persons have done, it is rather the Bulgarians who with some apparent justification might accuse us of inducing them into a fatal error. This belief in our insincerity was further confirmed by an article in the organ of the Russian War Ministry, the „*Ruski Invalid*" in August 1915, in which bitter complaints were made against the British and French for their inactivity at a time when the Russian front in Poland was collapsing under the hammer blows delivered by Hindenburg and Ludendorf. Russia, it was declared had sacrificed the flower of her troops in Masuria, in order to prevent the fall of Paris in 1914, but now her allies did nothing to succour her in her hour of need. This was an excellent opportunity offered to the pro-Germans and they made the most of it to convince the Bulgarians that the Western Powers were leaving Russia to exhaust herself in order that at the end of the war

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Mr. Lloyd George in his War Memoirs, Vol. IV, p. 2247 writes: „It was part of the War Office game to pretend that the Turks had formidable forces with ample reserves and if they were attacked seriously the Germans would rush to their succour and beat us off. They may have believed it, but if so, either their information was defective or they were easily taken in. In either event it was a failure of intelligence". Mr. Lloyd George lays stress on his affirmation by publishing a report by the military council at Versailles drawn up at the end of 1916, in which it was stated that the condition of Turkey was one of almost complete material and moral exhaustion etc. The Bulgarians naturally were quite aware of Turkey's weakness and inability to defend herself, and they could not interprete the Allies lack of enterprise in the Near East except by ascribing it to England's unwillingness to hand over the Straits to Russia.

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they might deprive her of Constantinople. And if Russia was thus left in the lurch it was easy to infer what would happen to Bulgaria if by misfortune she joined the Entente and was simultaneously attacked by both the Austro-Germans and her neighbours.

The first concrete offer to Bulgaria was made on May 29, but it was an aleatory one since in exchange for her intervention, the territorial gains promised in Macedonia were to materialise only when, and if, Serbia received Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Central Powers responded by a counter offer of the whole of Macedonia in exchange for Bulgaria's neutrality. A further offer by the Entente was made on August 3, and a final one on September 14. The latter guaranteed the 1912 incontested zone in Macedonia to Bulgaria at the end of the war, the Enos-Midia line in Thrace, and diplomatic support for the transfer of the Cavalla region and southern Dobroudja; but when Serbia's consent to these concessions became known, it was found that they were hedged in with certain reservations which robbed the offer of most of its value. However, it came too late, for Ferdinand had already signed on September 6, an alliance with Germany and pledged himself jointly with the Central Powers to attack Serbia. If this Bulgarian attack was staved off for so long it was solely owing to the doubts the Bulgarian Government entertained as to the attitude of Greece and Rumania, both of which had at first declared that they would not countenance a Bulgarian aggression on Serbia. Later, however, their attitude radically changed, and both encouraged Bulgaria to attack her western neighbour. (Cf. Bulgarian Orange Book vol. I. Nos. 347, 381, 577. 1099, 1107). King Constantine's assurances that he would allow a free hand to Bulgaria were transmitted through German official circles; he had telegraphed to the Kaiser that he would not attack Germany's allies unless they attacked him, but subsequently his messages to Bulgarian representatives were marked with such cordiality that Ferdinand annotated one with the significant words: „La conduite du roi Constantin est vraiment irreprochable". (Bulgarian Orange Book vol. II, No. 108. In an interview with Major Kableshkov, the Bulgarian military attache in Athens, Constantine affirmed:

> That he was not opposed to the entry of Bulgarian troops in Greece, that their conduct was excellent and that he had complete confidence in the Bulgarian Government. The good conduct of the Bulgarian troops would prevent Venizelos making capital out of their presence in Greek territory. The Entente was all talk and no action, it was Germany alone that showed initiative. As for the English army, it was a mob of undisciplined and untrained men. His brother Prince Andrew had bought a horse for fifty drachmae from a British soldier. others had bought motor cycles for twelve drachmae, British soldiers would sell thair pants in order to procure drinks. (Bulgarian Orange Book vol. II № 220).

In a previous interview with Passarov, the Bulgarian Minister in Athens, on August 19, 1915, Constantine had stated:

> „According to the information I possess, you will side with Germany. We shall follow the same policy, because I shall not permit a different one, since both our nations will be with Germany, even this most difficult question of Cavalla will be solved satisfactorily for both sides".

The King had begun his conversation with a long diatribe against Serbian intransigeance, and by expressing his conviction that Serbia was by far a more dangerous neighbour than Bulgaria. (Bulgarian Orange Book. vol. I. No. 1049).

No one was ever deluded about the professed Ententophilism, either of King Constantine or of the sundry Rumanian politicians [1] who at different times made fleeting appearances on the political chess-board, and no one should be surprised at their efforts to involve Bulgaria on the side of the Central Powers; for the elimination of a rival among those who curried the favours of the Entente would correspondingly enhance the price of those who still remained neutral. After the fiasco of the Dardanelles expedition, there was no apparent reason for being in a hurry; on the contrary, the more the Great Powers exhausted themselves, the greater became the market value of each prospective ally, and each of these could bide its time. What, however, provokes the indignation of all honest men is that Greece and Rumania should have been allowed after the war to make capital out ot their pretended Ententophilism to the detriment of Bulgaria, when it is they who by the encouragements they gave to Bulgaria enabled the latter to launch her attack on Serbia and protract the war by at least two years.

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[1] Rumania, on September 11, 1914 had actually offered to take an active part against Russia if the territory of Suczawa were ceded

The negotiations with Germany were conducted in complete secrecy and behind the backs of most of the Ministers. General Fitchev, the Minister of War, was dismissed from his post on August 17, 1915 in order that he might not be apprised of the activities of those of his subordinates who owing to their devotion to Ferdinand had been entrusted with the drawing up of the military convention. Chief among these was Gantchev, an officer compromised in several disreputable affairs and a criminal, who owed his position and liberty to his master. (Protocols of the State Trial p. 660 etc.) All the military leaders who had distinguished themselves during the Balkan wars were replaced by younger officers, who had actively encouraged Ferdinand in attacking Serbia and Greece in 1913, like Generals Jekov and Jostov, the new comman-

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to her in reward. After the battle of the Marne the offer was suppressed, before it could be accepted. (Cf. Winston S. Churchill. The World Crisis, the Eastern Front p. 222).

648 der-in-chief and chief of the army staff, whose participation in enginering the attack on June 29, 1913 is graphically described in Minister Pechev's Memoirs. Some 30,000 Macedonians were enrolled and trained long before the publication of the mobilisation decree on the night of September 21, in order that they might be used if necessary as a bludgeon to overawe the Bulgarians into accepting the policy which had been decided on. The Macedonians had made repeated efforts to convince the Allies of the necessity of transferring their native land to Bulgaria, but disgusted at the irresoluteness the Entente displayed, they finally threw in their lot with the Germans and actively assisted the latter in putting into operation their plans. Dr. Vladov one of their leaders had approached at an early date Savinsky, the Russian ambassador in Sofia and told him:

> „If only you succeed in obtaining for Bulgaria the Macedonian territories which should be hers according to the Bulgaro-Serbian agreement of 1912, the whole country will be up in arms and fight at your side. Should the Government try and oppose us, we would force them to desist: as to the King, we who have more than once faced death, would not hesitate to do away with him should he attempt to thwart our political ambitions". (Recollections of a Russian diplomat. p. 204).

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721 The ministers of the Triple Entente presented an ultimatum on October 4 summoning Bulgaria to break off relations with the Central Powers, to which Radoslavov replied with an indignant protest of innocence that could hardly be surpassed in duplicity; this having been considered as unsatisfactory, the Entente representatives severed diplomatic relations with Bulgaria and left on October 7. A few days later the Bulgarian army, as it had been prearranged, crossed into Serbia in order to support the Austro-German attack on that country which had already begun.[1]

[1] (For details of the military operations see the writer's contribution to „Bulgaria & Rumania," in the Nations of to-day series, published by Hodder & Stoughton).

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721 The occupation of Macedonia did not render the Radoslavov Gevernment any the more popular in the eyes of the people. The chief brunt of the fighting fell on the Bulgarians, because the Germans after reaching Kragujevats withdrew their forces and left only one army corps to support Bulgaria. This relieved to some extent the pressure on the Serbian army and enabled it to retreat through Albania to the Adriatic. Apparently von Mackensen's plan was to open up communications with Turkey and did not consist of annihilating the Serbian army which would have involved much greater sacrifices for the Germans. After completing the conquest of Macedonia, the Bulgarian army leaders insisted on occupying Salonica, so as to eliminate an eventual enemy thrust from that quarter in order that they might then proceed to the partial demobilisation of the army; to this demand, however, the Germans opposed a resolute refusal. They considered that the maintenance of the Salonica front suited best their purpose, for the Bulgarian army which could not be employed in th west, could be used to tie down a corresponding number of Entente troops which would necessarily be detached from the Western front where otherwise they would have to be faced by Germans. Radoslavov in his „Bulgaria and the world crisis", p.137/8, affirms that:

> „The attack on Salonica was not undertaken because it was believed that Greece would eventually join the Central Alliance. She had already permitted the taking of Rupel, Drama, and Cavalla according to a written prearranged plan. Early in 1916 von Falkenhayn decided ~~not~~ to take Salonica and was supported by Hindenburg though General Conrad von Hötzendorf held the contrary view. Soon after the occupation of Serbia, serious divergences arose between Bulgaria and Austria over Prizren and Prishtina, both States demanding their incorporation into their respective territory".

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648 Serious difficulties were created also through the Germans attempting to lay hands on all available supplies in Bulgaria and through their forcing the Bulgarian army

724 648 ● commissariat to furnish provisions far beyond those necessary for the limited number of German troops on the Macedonian front. In the State Trial of the Radoslavov Cabinet it was revealed that while the Germans had between 16,000 and 18,000 troops on the Southern front they were drawing rations for over 100,000 men. The balance above their requirements was sent to Germany. Each German soldier had the right to send 5kg of foodstuffs a week home, and for this purpose there was a perpetual stream of German soldiers arriving in Bulgaria from occupied Serbia buying up provisions and returning. This extensive draining of the resources of Bulgaria, increased through the illicit export of provisions systematically undertaken by the Ministers and their supporters, caused a serious dearth. Minister Pechev notes in his Memoirs, 22. XII. 1935:

> „To Ghendovitch and other deputies was being granted a licence to export 200 truck-loads of flour. Shameful. Often the names of Ministers figure in the minutes of Cabinet sittings at which export licences have been granted, though the Ministers were not present“

These malpractices took such a scandalous form that they even impressed a former Prussian Minister of War, General Dr. Stein, who alludes to them in his „Erlebnisse und Betrachtungen aus der Zeit des Weltkrieges“, published in Leipzig in 1919. In order to protect the food supply of the troops, General Jostov, the chief of the Staff, notified von Mackensen, without consulting the Government, that no more German troops were to be sent to Macedonia owing to the difficulty of providing them with supplies. Radoslavov in his book (Op. cit. p. 139) affirms that this was a pretext, and that Jostov considered that the aim of the war having been attained, Bulgaria ought
721 to seek to conclude peace with the Entente. When Ru-
648 mania declared war against Austria-Hungary, influential circles in Bulgaria attempted to maintain Bulgaria neutral

in the conflict. The Rumanian Minister in Sofia gave assurances that Rumania would support Bulgaria's claim to Macedonia, that she would retrocede southern Dobrudja, and that she would intervene in order that a separate peace be concluded with the Entente, and that finally, Bulgaria would secure the Midia-Enos line in Thrace. The Opposition did its best to convince Radoslavov of the expediency of this policy, it also sent delegates to Ferdinand to plead in favour of the adoption of this plan, but Ferdinand rejected them with contumely and ordered Radoslavov to declare war on Rumania which was done on September 1, 1916, four days later than Germany. 721 648

After the occupation of the Dobrudja, the Germans started requisitioning all the available supplies and this gave rise to continuous incidents between the Bulgarians and the Germans The occupation of the railway lines and the installing of German administrative authorities in certain parts of the Dobrudja which was claimed in its entirety by Bulgaria, caused a very grave conflict between the two allied governments, and strained relations almost to breaking point. 727

In the early spring of 1917, General Sarrail showed activity on the Salonica front and on July 2, Greece, after King Constantine's expulsion, officially declared war on Bulgaria. The Bulgarians appealed for assistance to Germany but received nothing save the advice to shorten their front by retreating. The dearth of foodstuffs and the ever-increasing pressure of the enemy on the Salonica front was rendering the situation in Bulgaria desperate. General Jekov was often in complete disagreement with the Government and refused to take orders from it. On September 20 the Agrarians sent a letter to the commander-in-chief proposing to him to overthrow the Radoslavov Government and assuring him of their willingness to continue the policy of co-operation with Germany. 722

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of the Democrats and Radicals was constituted in the hope of appeasing the army and public opinion. It was generally believed that the new Cabinet would attempt to conclude a separate peace with the Entente, but this was not within the domain of the possible, for the Cabinet could not count on the army which was entirely in the hands of the Germans and of Ferdinand. Besides, the railways were practically under the control of the Germans who could easily have flooded the country with their troops quartered in the adjoining regions. All Malinov could do was to insist on the Germans carrying out the stipulations of the Treaty, in order to secure some relief for the Bulgarian troops, and to improve the food supply while endeavouring to promote the conclusion of peace by supporting Austria in her endeavours. To this effect Malinov addressed on August 12 1918 a strongly worded note to the Central Powers complaining that since February, Bulgaria had ceased receiving war supplies, protesting against the stopping of the subsidy of 50 millions which had been so far granted to Bulgaria every three months, and demanding the dispatch of Germans reinforcements in order to strengthen the Salonica front where the Entente was continually massing troops. This note met apparently with some success since the Bulgarian representative in Berlin advised Malinov that the Germans would resume payment of the subsidy, forward munitions, and would despatch one German division to Macedonia. (Bulgarian Orange Book. vol II № 1542). 722

Ferdinand was resolutely opposed to the conclusion of a separate peace with the Entente. According to the deposition of the Bulgarian Minister in Vienna, Tochev, at the State Trial of the Radoslavov Cabinet, Ferdinand had declared to him in 1916: „That the war was lost, but that he would not conclude a separate peace and become a traitor to his allies". 722 648

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## BULGARIA-PAST & PRESENT

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Ferdinand had no illusions about the outcome of the struggle: On June 11, 1918, he addressed a telegram to General Jekov expressing his forebodings as to the impending close of his activity in the Near East. Jekov replied that a change in the Government might raise the drooping morale of the troops, but the newly constituted Malinov Cabinet, though it was aware of the difficult position the army was in, was not helped by Ferdinand in its desire to conclude a separate peace. It would perhaps have acted more energetically if it had been a broad coalition Cabinet instead of being composed of two parties only, the remainig parties not appearing desirous of assuming any responsibility at the time. In spite of the reluctance of Ferdinand to the conclusion of a separate peace, the Cabinet entrusted seveval persons abroad with the task of sounding Entente circles as to the possibility of coming to terms. President Wilson was the only person to respond favourably to these advances by dispatching Mr. Murphy to Sofia in order to facilitate the Bulgarian Government's task in its efforts to conclude peace. Both Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Robert Cecil were favourably disposed to the conclusion of a separate peace with Bulgaria and at the conferences which took place in Paris during July 1918 expressed themselves in support of this idea, but the French, were utterly opposed; General Guillaumat, who had a short time previously been relieved from his post of commander of the Salonica army, expressed the view that the Bulgarians could be easily beaten and that it was useless to make concessions to them. Mr, Lloyd George was finally won over to the opinions of General Guillaumat, and early in September the British, who were previously opposed to the undertaking of an offensive in Macedonia, gave their consent and General Franchet d'Esperay, the new commander-in-chief, hastened to carry out the plan which had been prepared by his predecessor several months previously.

the officials, whom he denounced as social parasites. He hated and envied all who were his betters; he refused the admission of Intellectuals to the Agrarian party "because they could at a certain moment abandon it and go elsewhere", "we shall guard our union from that demoralising element, the barrister profession". Stambuliiski who had been supported by his wife while studying had a very poor opinion of the fair sex. He affirmed that:

> "Marriage, woman and family are thraldom to man: a mass of heroes succumbs daily owing to their being led astray by woman, who may be likened to a veritable floating mine placed in the stream of life".

He earnestly believed that Europe had only two courses to follow, either to adopt Bolshevism or copy Agrarian Bulgaria. His self-complacency had apparently no bounds since he stated that:

> „My profound belief is that the Bulgarian peasantry with its sane spirit of reform will set an example to great nations, which though they may possess a great economic culture are nevertheless very backward in political conciousness".

He certainly showed signs of unbalanced judgment in his last years. He proceeded to subsidise an Agrarian party newspaper in Bucarest, giving thereby offence to the Rumanian Government. He dispatched a certain Groskov to conduct secret pourparlers with Angora, arousing the suspicion of the British Government, which had not yet settled its differences with Kemalist Turkey; nominated relatives and acquaintances to the post of Ministers abroad who were utterly unfit for the missions entrusted to them etc. The one sensible idea he seemed to have at heart was that of working for a close understanding whith Yugoslavia, but even this may have had an interested motive, for frindship with this country was incompatible with fraternisation with the Communists, and Stambuliiski had often declared that if he were ever forced to yield up

661 the reins of power he would only hand them over to the
648 Communists, „my faithful hounds", as he aptly styled them. This open flirtation with the Soviets estranged him from the more sensible leaders of the Green international and this prevented him from heading this movement. When the Bolsheviki were on the outskirts of Warsaw in the summer of 1920, he became so elated at their success as to remark to a group of intimate friends that it would not be long before he would administer to the Entente the lesson it deserved. In April 1923 it became known that he contemplated celebrating his jubilee on August 30, when an extraordinary congress of the Agrarian Union was to be convoked for the purpose. In May he declared that he was about to convene an extraordinary Sobranye for the purpose of altering the Constitution and proclaiming a republic. He withdrew secretly 100 million leva from the Bulgarian National Bank for the pretended purpose of bribing the members of the Reparation Commission at Sofia and obtaining their consent. The threat of a repu-
669 blican move was taken advantage of by Stambuliiski's numerous opponents to persuade Tsar Boris to give his consent to the overthrow of his too domineering Prime Minister, and on June 9, 1923, the Agrarian regime was unexpectedly overthrown, after Tsankov, Smilov and Kazazov had obtained from Tsar Boris the signature of the decrees appointing the new Government, (Cf. Gr. Tsesmedjiev's", Rays of light on the mystery of the conspiracy").

No one was averse to this consummation, and even foreign governments made it known that they would acquiesce in this move owing to the deplorable effects the Agrarian regime was having on such foreign capital as was invested in Bulgaria as well as on the public finances of the country. In fact after the fall of the regime, criminal proceedings were instituted against practically all the members of the Agrarian Government, who were indicted for as when I was visiting the trenches during the war". Between October 1923 and the end of April 1925 there had 669 been thirty two armed incursions into Bulgaria by the emigrant Agrarians in Yugoslavia. Nevertheless the Cabinet in spite of all this provocation did not apply any extraordinary repressive measures and it was only after the attempt on the life of Tsar Boris and the blowing up of the cathedral in which the whole Cabinet, the officer corps and prominent members of Sofia society were present on April 16, 1925, for the funeral of a general who had been murdered by Communists, (in which outrage 128 were killed and several hundred wounded) that martial law was proclaimed and the Government proceeded to deal with a heavy hand with its opponents. But the revolt which followed can hardly be ascribed to the belated severity of the Tsankov Government, for the Agrarians had not ceased to declare the imminence of an outbreak aiming at the overthrow of the Government. The revolt was ruthlessly quelled and unwonted violence shown on both sides; for a few months a veritable reign of terror prevailed. It is computed that over 20,000 were killed and serious destruction to property was inflicted. But no Government could have done otherwise after the provocation it had received, and the incitements to vengeance on the part of the relatives of the victims of the outrage of April 16, with which it was besieged. Taking advantage of the unrest which obtained, 648 the Greek dictator Pangalos seized the occasion to invade distraught Bulgaria hoping to win thereby easy laurels and enhance his prestige. Fortunately the League of Nations supported by the Great Powers rushed in to stamp out a new conflagration and not only forced Pangalos to beat a hasty retreat but made him disburse an indemnity of 30,000,000 leva for the damage caused by his troops in the Petritch district.[1]

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[1] Had the League intervened in the conflict which arose between Italy and Greece in 1923 and prevented the Italian bombard- 000

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## BULGARIA-PAST & PRESENT

• 648 On the whole Tsankov had been faced with an ex
remely heavy task and although supported by one of th
most intelligent Chambers Bulgaria had so far had, wa
not able to accomplish anything of importance His act
vities were absorbed in creating a new party, suppressin
revolts, tracking down conspirators and finally he took t
limiting political rights and freedom when all pretence c
idealism disappeared. In the foreign field Tsankov was equ
ally unfortunate, in the hope of renewing commercial re
lations with Turkey he concluded a Treaty which wa
ratified on October 18, 1925 by which Bulgaria secure
certain privileges for her exports, but these advantage
proved illusory, for when the Treaty expired a year late
the Turks refused to renew it and in the meanwhile Bu
garia had agreed to an exchange of populations abando
ning to Turkey, property belonging to her nationals, va
lued at 10 milliard leva, which the Turks never paid fo
as is their wont. Tsankov likewise attempted to win th
friendship of Yugoslavia by paying a personal visit to Be
grade, but was not successful, for his Agrarian opponent
who were hand in glove with the Yugoslav Governmen
poisoned the atmosphere against him and rendered th
conclusion of such ties nugatory. This flirtation with Yu
goslavia does not seem to have met with the approval o
Court circles and suddenly Tsankov was relegated to th
post of president of the Sobranye and replaced early in Ja
nuary 1926 by Liaptchev, supported by Burov and Mollov
661 all three members of the Democratic Entente. Tsanko
had been unjustly accused of introducing a regime o
White Terror in Bulgaria; those mostly responsiple fo
the brutalities which were certainly committed were hi
military supporters and advisers, General Vulkov, the Pa

880 **ment of Corfu, General Pangalos would have certainly not forme
the opinion that the League was a broken reed, and that in his tur
he could bully disarmed Bulgaria.**

642 Prof. A. Tsankov, was disavowed by his colleagues, who tendered their resignations and this brought about the fall of the Cabinet.

Tsar Boris entrusted on April 1935 M. A. Tochev, a close associate of ex-Tsar Ferdinand, whose former activities are recorded at length in the Bulgarian Orange book, and who had not a little share in precipitating the second Balkan war and encouraging the subsequent pro-German attitude of Bulgaria, to assume office. That T. Tochev has not wavered in his pro-German sympathies is proved by the enthusiastic welcome his Government extended to General Göring during the latter's visit to Sofia. Simultaneously a proclamation was issued promising the Bulgarian people a new Constitution more in harmony with national traditions and with the views set forth by the army in the manifesto of May 19, 1934. The proclamation ended with a formal assurance that no return to the party system would be tolerated. This was merely to allay the susceptibilities of the military, for everything points to a gradual return to the old system under a modified form.

648 The appointment of one of the most dexterous rope-dancers of the old Ferdinand circus as chief counsellor to the Crown was not a judicious act, and it has certainly not enhanced the prestige and authority of the State, nor contributed to the promotion of concord in the country. Much of the good work initiated by the Gheorghiev Government has been undone and the principles of its foreign policy are being gradually abandoned. The close association of Bulgaria with Yugoslavia was the cardinal aim of the colleagues of K. Gheorghiev and would have eventually aided the political union of the two countries, since Bulgaria in her present amputated form is unable to maintain the costly administrative mechanism of a modern State.

This ideal is now in grave danger of being frustrated.

This policy is not to the liking of that great army of functionaries, supported by the old politicians, and of the palace circles, to all of whom self-interest suggests opposition to anything even remotely suggesting a curtailment of their country's sovereignty. To them the strained political situation in Europe has come as a gift of the Gods, for it holds out the promise of a turn in the wheel of fortune and of a means of retrieving what was lost in the war. This implies an adventurous policy and entails some carefully prepared preliminary steps. Such a policy must be made to appeal to the masses as likely to ameliorate their present difficult lot and at the same time, the feeling of patriotism has to be exorcised in order to make war appear once more an invigorating and lucrative pursuit. 648

Hence the persistent circulation of such mendacious reports to the effect that Gt. Britain was opposed to the policy of a close understanding between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, and that she has decided to impress Bulgaria into her service and confide to the latter the defence of British interests in the Near East. „We are navigating in British waters“ is the general comment on the present situation with which one is greeted in Sofia. And the prospect of the British Pactolus pouring its goldbearing stream on the barren fields of Bulgaria makes all and sundry beam with smiles. At the same time feverish efforts are being made to instill some patriotic ardour in the masses by intensive flag-waiving and drum-beating. There were never so many parades, patriotic speeches, and celebrations of commemorations of victories, ridiculous in themselves, since they all ended in a catastrophe, as there have been during the past few months.

The direct cosequence of entrusting the government 661 to compromised personalities is that official statements and acts are regarded with mistrust.

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# 8 SOVIETIZING THE BALKAN REGION

## I

● 648 RUMANIA AND BULGARIA, both allied with Hitler during World War II, were of necessity doomed to Soviet rule once the fighting was ended. Yet it should be remembered that neither country had been an enthusiastic partner of the German dictator. Rumania in particular had suffered during the thirties from constant bloody clashes between the moderate supporters of the Monarchy and a fascist movement known as the Iron Guard. Many thousands of persons were executed or slain, and the civil liberties of the nation almost disappeared. In the end, the Germans gained control, and the Rumanian Army became part of their war machine. Bulgaria, too, had lived under virtual dictatorship; and when the Nazis found it possible to satisfy at least partially the expansionist desires of the regime, there came into being an uneasy alliance which the majority of the people undoubtedly opposed. This sullen and strong opposition made it unwise to involve the Bulgarian Army in Nazi military adven-

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tures, and the Russians could legitimately conclude that the 648 ●
warm friendship suddenly manifested in both countries when Red troops marched in was not wholly sincere.

The United States made a serious effort to insure effective democratic government in the Balkan region. For example, with Great Britain, it protested against the manner in which the Bulgarian elections of November, 1945, were conducted. The voting had led to a scarcely contested triumph for the pro-Communist Fatherland Front. The matter was debated at the Moscow Conference which convened in the next month, and the Russians indicated that possession was just about the whole of the law, although they did agree to include representatives of other parties in the government. From that time on, Soviet domination of the two countries slowly and implacably became more complete, and any likelihood that Western intervention could alter the course of events evaporated like a morning mist.

Except Greece, Bulgaria was the country in which the Greek 648
Orthodox Church was strongest. Moslems were the only minor- [162]
ity of notable size, Jews and Roman Catholics and Protestants 795
being negligible in number.* Accordingly, as soon as the Russians had taken over and begun to establish a collectivist economy, the Orthodox Church was an object of immediate attention. There was a maneuver which has been a topic for speculative comment ever since. For many years the hostility between Bulgaria and Greece which had its roots in the struggle for Bulgarian independence had manifested itself also in the

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* Prewar population statistics for Bulgaria reveal that 83.5 per cent were Greek Orthodox; 14.3, Mohammedan; 0.9, Jewish; and 0.8, Roman Catholic. Postwar (1948) estimates for Rumania indicate that 72 per cent of the population were Orthodox; 10, Roman Catholics according to the Greek rite; 7, Roman Catholics; 4.6, Calvinists; 2.3, Jews; and 1.6, Lutherans. Other Protestant groups, including Unitarians and Baptists, constituted about 1 per cent. Most Rumanian Catholics and Protestants belonged to German or Hungarian minority groups.

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795 religious organization. Faithful to its Byzantine origins, the
648 Greek Orthodox Church recognized (as we have previously
[793] noted) the Patriarch of Constantinople as its head, but accepted the Hierarchy of Greece as the center of ecclesiastical power. This Hierarchy had, however, ruled that the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was a schismatic body, and all pleas that its decision be altered fell on deaf ears. When the war ended, the Bulgarian Holy Synod met and elected the Metropolitan of Sofia president and head of the Church with the title Exarch Stephan I. He had long fished in the troubled waters of Bulgarian politics and was widely known as an anti-Communist, but now he began to manifest a zealous ardor in support of Communism which virtually knew no bounds. When he made representations to the Constantinople Patriarch that the curse of schism be lifted from the Bulgarian Church, an affirmative answer was received, owing no doubt to the weakness of the Greeks and the peril in which they at that time found themselves.

Much going and coming ensued. Stephan journeyed to Kiev, Moscow, and Leningrad. In turn the Patriarch of Moscow, despite his eighty years, made an official visit to Bulgaria. Not a few students of the situation reason that a plan had been concocted to make the Patriarch of Moscow head of all the Eastern Orthodox Churches, conferring a new and signal distinction upon the Russian capital, which would thus become not only the world center of Communism but also the "Third Rome," and manifestly rival the Vatican in importance as a seat of ecclesiastical authority. The plan—if it actually existed—soon ceased to bear any relation to reality; but it is interesting to conjecture as to what might have happened if the Greeks had been absorbed into the Russian orbit.

All this had a complex and sometimes confusing historical background. The services rendered by the Orthodox clergy

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to the cause of Bulgarian independence, and to the resurrection 795
of the Bulgarian language as a medium of literary expression, 648
gave the Church universally recognized prestige. After 1878, when national freedom was gained, the Orthodox Church was a State institution, and the members of its Hierarchy were public officials. A portion of the national budget was set aside to support the Church, which in addition owned considerable property largely derived from bequests. The case was comparable with that of a large state university in the United States. Salaries of professors in such a university are paid out of the state treasury; but it may own not inconsiderable wealth in its own right, is permitted to collect fees from students and to charge for other services rendered. When one considers the rural character of Bulgaria and the poverty of most of its 6,000,000-odd people, the financial strength of Orthodoxy reflected in such magnificent structures as the Archiepiscopal Palace in Sofia is genuinely impressive. Clergymen of all ranks officiated on public occasions; and, though the spirituality of the Bulgarian people may well have been far from deep, they prized the Church as the primary agency of the national culture.

Bulgarian education enjoyed a well merited repute, and the 871
theological schools established after 1878 ranked high among 794
the country's institutions of higher learning. The training given consisted in the main of what we should call "general education," theology being taught as a field of specialization. The result was that many leading citizens were graduates of these schools. Religious instruction, normally by laymen, was likewise included in the curricula of elementary and secondary schools. About 4,000 churches served the people, under the direction of the Holy Synod. This body also fostered breadth of view, and held membership in the World Council of Churches prior to the war. On the whole, the religious situation

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659 nals, one of them the organ of the Communist-dominated
793 Synod, made propaganda at the government's behest. Every-
626 one who gave any indication of fidelity to the Christian creed in its true significance and glory had to reckon with the possibility that he would speedily be sentenced to one of the dreaded prisons—Kolarovgrad, for example—which were always crammed with the unfortunate victims of tyranny.

659 The Orthodox Church having been transformed into an ab-
798 ject lackey of the State, Communist wrath descended on the religious minorities. Protestants were the first victims. Missionaries had come to Bulgaria from Turkey, and had established schools which, despite wars and upheavals, gave a good education to boys and girls. An exemplary woman introduced the kindergarten system and trained native teachers. By the close of World War I, hostility to Protestants had pretty largely died down; and although the small congregations did not grow rapidly they successfully maintained their identities. Their pride and joy was the American College, situated near Sofia. It was closed by the Nazis in 1942 and has not been reopened. The work of the Y.M.C.A. and the Y.W.C.A. was suppressed at the same time, and the Communist regime has not lifted the prohibition.

611 The legislation adopted during February, 1949 (often re-
627 ferred to as the Canonical Purity Laws) contained a number
● 648 of provisions designed to render impossible any religious activity under the auspices of a Church or institution with headquarters outside Bulgaria. It stipulated, for example, that any Church or any clergyman desiring "canonical relations with or aid or gifts from" institutions, organizations, or official personages abroad must secure permission in advance from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It was presumably under this legislation that fifteen Protestant pastors were brought to trial for high treason during 1949. It was the first large-scale action

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against Protestants in any satellite country, though to be sure 631
Protestant Churches had suffered grievously in Czechoslo- 687
vakia, Hungary, and Poland. The pastors, none of whom had 648 ●
occupied a position of eminence, were confronted with a lengthy list of charges. In particular they had, the Public Prosecutor contended, given military, economic, and political information to representatives of hostile foreign powers. They were also accused of having "spread malicious rumors about Russia." Those indicted—the Reverend Basil Ziapkov, for example—made confessions of the length desired and pleaded for mercy. The Court pronounced sentences of varying severity.

Manifestly this trial was also a blow struck at the prestige of the United States, from which most of the support for the Protestant congregations had come. Its primary effect was, no doubt, that the curtain was rung down on any hopes Bulgarian citizens might have that diplomatic intervention by the West would blunt the edge of the Soviet sickle, or that Washington could defend the interests of Americans in regions under Russian domination. How complete the resulting loss of morale 735
was can be deduced from the official statements issued by the 653
other Churches on the subject of the ordeal to which Protestantism had been subjected. The Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church declared, for example:

> In accordance with our Church's traditional solicitude for fostering the aspirations of the people and maintaining loyalty to the State, the Holy Synod has always exhorted its clergy to look upon themselves as preachers of the Divine Word and as guardians of the Holy Spirit, and to remain aloof from all political influences hostile to the country and its people. We must add that the pastors of the Holy Orthodox Church have consistently obeyed our admonition. Not one of them has been prosecuted by the authorities on account of religious activities.
>
> The Holy Synod strongly condemns all subversive activities carried

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# XVI

## MACEDONIA: OLD STRUGGLES IN NEW DISGUISES

> A new period of embittered nationalist agitation, national hate, and national-bourgeois wars threatens the Balkan and Danube peoples. Only the Proletariat can, through its victory, avert a new catastrophe.
>
> G. Zinoviev, 1920

CASTING about for means to damage Tito, the men in the Kremlin must have thought often and long about Macedonia, the meeting-place of three rival nationalities—Jugoslav, Bulgar and Greek. The first two merge to some extent, and to the extent that they do—a violently debated point—another nationality is formed, the Macedonian. Those inhabitants who feel themselves more Macedonian than Jugoslav, Bulgar or Greek further complicate the picture of national rivalries by demanding a separate state of their own. Since in addition nature made Macedonia a poor land, and since men and governments have kept it so, any régime in any part of the area is bound to have many enemies. One would have expected the Soviets to capitalize on this situation by staging revolts against Tito in the Macedonian districts which constitute the Jugoslav Macedonian People's Republic. But thus far they have been foiled by the difficulty of bringing nationalist and Communist currents into a single stream of action. 000

Russia, whether Tsarist or Soviet, has always been tempted to take a hand in the struggle over Macedonia, hoping that by picking the winner she might secure control of a land bridge to the Aegean and thus to the Mediterranean. Usually she has taken Bulgaria as her protégé, and usually Bulgaria has welcomed the rôle. Tsarist min- 648

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648 isters manœuvred to get as much of the debatable territory as possible for Bulgaria, and when the prospects for this seemed poor, advocated the creation of an autonomous Macedonian state which eventually might come under Bulgarian sway. After the Revolution, the Kremlin tried to devise a policy which would serve traditional Russian designs and also the interests of international revolutionary Communism. Unlike the former strategists of St. Petersburg, those of Moscow had two barrels to their gun and wanted to be free to fire whichever seemed most likely to bring down the quarry. But they never could quite make up their mind to pull either the nationalist or the revolutionary trigger; and they are unable to do so today.

For a time the Kremlin came close to adopting a policy for Macedonia based, like that of the Tsars, on nationalism. The Fifth Plenum of the Comintern in the spring of 1924 encouraged the Balkan Communist Parties to make common cause with the I.M.R.O. (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) and other Macedonian nationalist groups, and to that end proclaimed "the right of oppressed nationalities to self-determination, up to political secession." [1] This suited Bulgarian aspirations. Bulgaria had been on the wrong side in both the Second Balkan War and the First World War and therefore had little to lose by any possible "secession," but she had hopes that a new Macedonian national state created at the expense of Jugoslavia and Greece might someday become part of a Greater Bulgaria. The Jugoslav and Greek Communist Parties immediately complained loudly; the I.M.R.O. held back from the alliance with Bulgaria; several of its rival leaders were murdered in quick succession; and the whole manœuvre foundered in the usual Macedonian welter of discord, treachery and blood.

000 Later, Nazi Germany's espousal of revisionism and racism made these unsuitable themes for Communist propaganda, and from the time of the Comintern Congress of 1935 prevailing Communist tactics were based on "popular fronts" with Social Democrats. The Comintern did not abandon its reliance on national Communist parties for the long revolutionary pull; but as a tactical manœuvre

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[1] For a convenient summary of events through 1949 see "Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Politics," by Elizabeth Barker. London and New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1949.

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in the period of extreme Nazi peril it played down nationalism as a 003 revolutionary weapon, minimized the revolutionary rôle of the Red Army and emphasized Marxism's reformist aspects. After the Nazi attack, Stalin revived the emphasis on nationalism with a bang; and the successful progress and outcome of the Great Patriotic War prepared the way for the reappearance of nationalism in international Communist tactics.

When the Nazi armies overran Jugoslavia and Greece, Hitler Y placed most of Macedonia in charge of his Bulgarian allies, who 648 B tried with usual Balkan violence and lack of success to convince its 727 inhabitants that they were all Bulgars. One reason why Tito developed the political organ of the Partisan movement, the AVNOJ, described in an earlier chapter, was in order that there might exist some national body to protest enemy annexations and occupations—Italian and Hungarian as well as Bulgarian—and stake out Jugoslavia's counterclaims in debatable areas. Thus at a meeting at Jajce in November 1943 the AVNOJ adopted a resolution setting forth Jugoslav territorial claims against Italy, which had just collapsed, and another calling for the future organization of Jugoslavia on a federal basis and naming Macedonia as one of the six component units. The borders of Macedonia were not specified. In other words, no indication was given whether Tito would be content with the part of Macedonia which had formed part of the national territory before the war or would try to enlarge Jugoslav holdings at Bulgaria's expense. Tito asked for Stalin's approval of the Jajce program, and secured it.

But although Stalin approved the Jajce declaration he was not Y ready to relinquish the Bulgarian card entirely, as was presently 648 shown by the fact that the Bulgarian Communists continued to espouse a contrary solution for the Macedonian question, joining B with other anti-Nazi Bulgarian elements in proclaiming that the only way to dispose permanently of the "apple of discord" would be 648 to merge the three segments—Jugoslav, Greek and Bulgarian—in "an integral, free and independent Macedonia." Nor did he forbid them to indicate which nation was entitled to be the "apple's" custodian: their proclamation described Macedonia as "the cradle of the Bulgarian nation for which a river of blood has been given."

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In other words, the Bulgarian Communist Party appealed again to the "right of secession," approved by the Comintern 20 years earlier, as the basis for a new Macedonian deal following the war.

Stalin simply aimed to keep the situation fluid, of course, so that he could impose whatever final solution best suited Russian interests. Hitler had allowed the Bulgars to occupy Jugoslav Macedonia but not formally to annex it. Stalin hedged in the same manner. He approved the plan to make Jugoslav Macedonia one of the units of the future Jugoslav Republic, but permitted the Bulgarian Communists to continue hoping that all parts of Macedonia might be brought together in an independent state. Possibly there might even be advantages in allowing the Jugoslavs and Bulgars to fulfill the dreams of idealists in time past by joining hands to form a South Slav state, thus offsetting Italy on one side and Turkey on the other and incidentally overshadowing and overawing Greece. As to this he would wait and see. Conceivably he might confound both Jugoslavia and Bulgaria by creating a Macedonian state and incorporating it directly into the Soviet Union. For the present, however, he encouraged both nationalism and Communism, and drove them in double harness.

The Jugoslav and Bulgarian Communists remained on bad terms until Marshal Tolbukhin's armies entered the Balkans in the autumn of 1944. Then political power in Sofia passed to the Fatherland Front, composed of Agrarians, Socialists, Communists and other anti-Nazi elements; Bulgaria left the Axis; and the Bulgarian Army switched from its rôle as an occupying force in Jugoslav and Greek Macedonia and joined the Jugoslav Partisans in attacking the retreating Germans.

Towards the end of the year Tito sent his leading foreign policy adviser, Edvard Kardelj, to Sofia to see whether the time had not come to solve the Macedonian problem within the framework of a Jugoslav-Bulgarian federation. Soviet successes were at a high tide from the Baltic to the Aegean. Rumania and Bulgaria were "in the bag," with Communists in key government posts and Soviet troops backing them up. Marshal Rokossovsky waited watchfully outside Warsaw while the Nazis finished mopping up General Bor's Polish patriots, and made ready to move in for the kill. Belgrade had been

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captured in October, and Marshal Tolbukhin was pressing on into Hungary. The ELAS revolt had given the Communist-led forces control of most of Greece outside parts of Athens and the Piraeus.[2] While Tito was in Moscow in September he had realized that the speed of events made it wise to cash in at once on the fact that he had been Stalin's steadfast ally while the Bulgars had been Hitler's. The Bulgars of course saw this too and played for delay. Kardelj wrote Tito disgustedly from Sofia on December 23, 1944, that Traicho Kostov, the Bulgarian Communist leader with whom he was principally negotiating, wanted "far from what we proposed," indeed was willing to agree to no more than a "defensive alliance."

The main points of difference were whether Bulgaria should have equality in the proposed federation with each of the six Jugoslav republics or with Jugoslavia as one unit; what should be the new Bulgar-Jugoslav frontier, especially which nation should have the debatable Pirin district; and whether Bulgaria as an enemy country had the right to enter into an international agreement before a peace treaty had been signed. These and other controversial issues were to be fought and refought without decision for the next three years.

Real progress toward a Jugoslav-Bulgar rapprochement seemed to be registered when Prime Minister Georgi Dimitrov visited Marshal Tito at Bled in August 1947 and announcement was made that a treaty of friendship and a customs union were in prospect. Nothing was said publicly about the future of Macedonia; the ancient "apple of discord" still dangled tantalizingly between the two countries. Tito indicated that he still hoped federation might be the solution when he visited Sofia in November to sign the treaty. Bulgaria and Jugoslavia were being bound together so closely, he said, that "federation will be a mere formality." His optimism did not turn out to be justified. Tentative agreement was reached on specific phases of the Macedonian problem, such as the future of the

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[2] As a hedge against the possibility that Greece would end up in the Western camp, Stalin in September 1944 instructed Ambassador Gusev, Soviet representative on the European Advisory Commission, to see whether the Bulgarians might not be left in possession of the parts of Western Thrace assigned to them by Hitler. But this was overplaying the Russian hand, and when Philip E. Mosely, the American deputy, replied that it would be intolerable to leave an ex-enemy in possession of an ally's territory, the proposal was dropped.

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Y 648 Pirin district; but it was most unsatisfactory to Sofia, and the whole controversial question was in fact still open when the Cominform B 648 resolution of June 1948 ended all prospect of friendship, let alone of federation. The discussion of the proposal for federation actually contributed, as we shall see in the next chapter, to Moscow's growing mistrust of Tito and hence to the final break.

Even after Stalin had lost Tito as an ally he found difficulty in exploiting the Macedonian question profitably in Soviet propaganda. The natural course would have been to come out openly for transferring control over Jugoslav Macedonia from the new enemies in Belgrade to the eager sycophants in Sofia. But to indicate that Tito's fall would produce this result would have strengthened his régime and ended the hope of Cominform forces overturning it from within. The best that Moscow could do was to permit the revival of Bulgarian propaganda for the creation of a separate Macedonian republic, in the name of Macedonian nationalism, but to take no part in it officially.

G 665 Even this limited Bulgarian propaganda[1] complicated things for the Greek Communists. The Greek people suspected one wing of the Greek Communist Party of being willing to contribute Greek territory to bring a separate Macedonian state into existence. The suspicion had been strengthened by a story that one of the old-line Greek Communists, Yannis Ioannides, had agreed in July 1943 with a Bulgarian Communist named Dushan Daskalov to carve a Macedonian state out of Greek, Bulgarian and Jugoslav territory after the war and incorporate it directly into the Soviet Union. The plan as reported was grandiose; apparently Turkey was to be deprived of Istanbul, which was to be included in the Macedonian Soviet Socialist Republic along with Salonika. Russia would at last control the Straits and dominate the Aegean. When the American intelligence first got wind of the story it assumed that it had been planted by Nazi propagandists; but then it learnt that Ioannides had visited Moscow just before his meeting with Daskalov, and other bits of corroborative evidence indicated the probability that the Soviets actually were setting up an alternative design for use in the event that Tito proved troublesome or Bulgaria in some manner escaped the Soviet net. True or not, the story aided the Greek anti-Com-

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[1] [i.e. Bulgarian propaganda for the creation of a separate Macedonian republic---Analyst]

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leagues; but of course he may simply have been endeavoring to offset criticisms being voiced against him by Party colleagues.

The trial was held in December 1949 in accordance with a new law, passed for the purpose, before a new court, set up for the purpose and from which there was no appeal. The sensation of the trial, and something new for Communist judges, was that Kostov in open court repudiated the confession which he was alleged to have signed in prison. The whole case against him was based on that confession and on the similar confessions of the other defendants. These did not revoke what they had said in jail but instead fell over themselves to confirm the worst of it and to find new grounds to inculpate both Kostov and themselves. While Kostov did not hide the fact that he had opposed Dimitrov in ideological and Party matters, or that he had miscalculated the strength of *kulaks* and other Bulgarian reactionary elements, he did categorically deny that he had ever been a spy or foreign agent, that he had had anything to do with sending Tito to Jugoslavia in 1934 or that he had been Tito's stooge in the negotiations for a Jugoslav-Bulgarian federation.

The judges at first could not believe their ears, and when Kostov insisted on repudiating his "confession" in spite of hoots from the audience and rebukes by his own counsel, they hastily adjourned court for half an hour to enable him to "rest" and "refresh his memory." After the rest period he still stuck to his guns. For two days the Communist press maintained a stunned silence. Then *Pravda* commented that Kostov had a "soft and oily voice" and the "cunning eyes of a thief," details which his colleagues might have noticed in the last twenty or thirty years, and a "bent back," which *Pravda* did not bother to explain he had acquired in 1924 when he jumped from a window in attempting to escape torture by the Sofia police.[4]

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The account of the negotiations for a Bulgarian-Jugoslav federation produced at the Kostov trial omits many well known facts and runs contrary to many others. Nothing is said about the active and

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[4] *Cf. The Economist*, London, December 24, 1949; for details of the trial see also *The New York Times*, December 8 and successive days.

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continuous part taken by Soviet officials in the negotiations. No hint is given that Kostov had been in favor of simply a defensive alliance. No reference is made to *Pravda's* criticism of Dimitrov in January 1948 for saying that the ultimate goal was a federation of all the East European peoples. In fact, one would gather from reading the Kostov indictment that Moscow knew little about the project for federation and consistently opposed it; that among the Bulgarian Communist leaders Kostov was the one who particularly favored it; that Dimitrov had never agreed to federation, and had not figured in the negotiations except to warn against it; and that the obnoxious suggestion for including other Balkan and Danubian countries originated entirely with Tito and his stooge, Kostov. Evidently Soviet apologists felt it necessary to rewrite a chapter of history that had become embarrassing.

The pretense that Moscow had no part in the negotiations has been demolished by Mosha Pijade.[8] It seems that when Kardelj left Sofia in December 1944 it was agreed that Bulgarian and Jugoslav representatives should reconvene in Belgrade the next month. But the Kremlin disapproved and the negotiations were transferred to Moscow. Not a word was said at the Kostov trial about this. Actually Kostov was not even present in Moscow; Dimitrov was still there to advise the Bulgarian delegation, and Kostov probably was needed at home. The chief negotiators were Vyshinsky and Zorin for the Soviet Union, Prime Minister Georgiev and Minister of the Interior Yugov for Bulgaria and Pijade for Jugoslavia. Although he could not go to Moscow, Kostov had prepared in advance the Bulgarian draft of a treaty (a copy of it exists in the Jugoslav archives, says Pijade, annotated and corrected in Kostov's hand). Whereas the Jugoslav draft proposed a definitive declaration that the two countries "are uniting" in a federal state, the Kostov draft was more preliminary, for the two governments would merely "declare that they are proceeding to a union," with such joint institutions as might be finally determined in an eventual constitution.

As things turned out, neither draft was formally discussed, for Vyshinsky indicated that the Soviet Union had decided that the first step should be a treaty of political, economic and military coöpera-

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[8] *Yugoslav Fortnightly*, Belgrade, January 27, 1950.

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tion (as Kostov had favored in his first talk with Kardelj). Vyshinsky asked Pijade to draw up a text; and using that as a basis Vyshinsky then prepared a draft of his own. On January 27, 1945, the three delegations agreed on the final text.* A day earlier the Bulgarians received word from Sofia that the British Government had just presented a démarche against federation. Pijade tells how letters thereupon were prepared for Georgiev and Tito to exchange when the treaty was ratified, reaffirming their intention of realizing "a federation of the South Slav peoples in the shortest possible time." This indicated that the federation was being merely deferred until Britain could no longer object on legal grounds. Obviously the Soviet representatives must have approved.

Bulgarian and Jugoslav aims conflicted from the start, says Pijade, in detail as well as in the general objective. Most notably, Bulgaria demanded equal status with the six Jugoslav republics as a single unit, whereas the Jugoslavs wanted a federation in which Bulgaria would have equality with each of the Jugoslav republics. He says that the first time the two delegations called on Stalin, Dimitrov argued that because Bulgaria had been an independent state she could not merge her identity in a group of seven; to which Pijade replied that Serbia and Motenegro had longer records as sovereign states than Bulgaria, and that he supposed the Croats, who had been independent a thousand years ago, were at least equal to the Bulgarians in importance. A couple of days later, continues Pijade, the two delegations were again received by Stalin, this time at a state banquet. Stalin himself reopened the subject, and gave his opinion that Bulgaria ought to form one of the seven federal units. Pijade adds: "The Bulgarians said nothing, while I had nothing to say."

When the conferees left Moscow the intention was that the treaty and the accompanying letters should be signed at Belgrade in February. Before then, however, the Jugoslav Ambassador reported from Sofia that although the British had vetoed a Jugoslav-Bulgarian federation they did not close the door to the idea of a wider grouping

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* Pijade notes that a copy of the Vyshinsky text exists in the Jugoslav archives, that he has his own manuscript copy of the final text and that the Jugoslav archives also contain a copy of it in Russian, initialled personally by Zorin, of the Soviet Foreign Office, as "seen," that is, approved.

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including Albania and two pro-Western states, Greece and Turkey. The Russians seem to have decided that with so much talk of a broad federation in the air it would be best for the time being to postpone even the Bulgarian-Jugoslav treaty of friendship. This was done. Pijade's sarcastic comment is that the case made out against Kostov was very unjust to the British—for if Bulgaria would have lost her independence by joining a federation in which she was only one among seven, as the prosecution affirmed, then it was the British who saved it by their veto.

As for the implication that Dimitrov was not involved, it is easily refuted. The plan for a treaty of friendship, dropped in 1945, was revived when Dimitrov was in Bled in the summer of 1947 and a treaty was signed when Tito visited Sofia in November. Rankovich has asserted that the treaty was still looked on at that time as simply a step towards federation.[7] Dimitrov said during a visit to Bucharest that the goal was a federation of the East European peoples, plus Greece. He seems to have talked in the same way when Prime Minister Hoxha of Albania came to Sofia to sign a treaty of friendship and mutual aid on December 16. Kardelj implied that bigger things were in the making when he presented the text of the Bulgarian treaty for ratification in the Jugoslav Presidium on January 8, 1948; it was an augury, he stated, of "collaboration between the Balkan-Danubian peoples." Moscow decided to lose no time in scotching the idea that anything of the sort would be permitted. *Pravda* wrote angrily on January 28 that a "Balkan or Danubian federation including Poland, Czechoslovakia and Greece" was inadmissible; "these lands do not need a problematical or farfetched federation or confederation and customs union but the strengthening and the defense of their independence and sovereignty by way of mobilization and organization of internal popular democratic strength." Dimitrov accepted the rebuke, and crawled. Neither he nor any member of the Bulgarian Government, he announced, "thinks or has ever thought of the creation of an Eastern bloc under any form whatsoever," and he thanked *Pravda* for its "valuable and useful warning."

Tito, who did not seize the same opportunity for "self-criticism,"

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[7] *Jugoslav Fortnightly*, Belgrade, February 1949.

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has since told why.[8] In February and early March of 1948 Kardelj and Djilas were in Moscow trying to speed up Soviet economic aid. A Bulgarian delegation was there at the same time, headed by Dimitrov, Kolarov and Kostov. "In the presence of that delegation," asserts Tito, "Stalin himself imperatively demanded the immediate conclusion of an act of federation between Jugoslavia and Bulgaria, while on the other hand the Soviet was against a federation with Albania." But in view of the fact that Jugoslav relations with the Soviet Union "were already strained" Tito looked on this renewal of the old plan with a fishy eye. "We came to the conclusion," he continues, "that the demand was put forward in order to facilitate the overthrow and subjugation of Jugoslavia." B 648 Y 648

Speaking of this matter with me, Tito explained that the creation of a Jugoslav-Bulgarian federation would have brought many Bulgarian leaders to Belgrade. Some would have received high places in the new joint government, and as they would have been under Russian orders Moscow would in this way have received a direct voice in Jugoslav affairs. He already was subject to so many kinds of Soviet interference that he was unwilling to open new doors for it. In any case, he added, not he but Dimitrov had taken the initiative for a federation to include Rumania and perhaps even Czechoslovakia. Dimitrov was unhappy over Bulgaria's increasing dependence on the Soviet Union and hoped to reverse the process by finding a place for her in a strong grouping. To a question as to why Dimitrov had not realized that this would get him into difficulties in Moscow, Tito replied that Dimitrov had just been in Bucharest, where his head had been turned a bit by the enthusiastic reception which he received from the Rumanian Communists and by the discovery that they too were restive under the tight Soviet rein. As a result, said Tito, Dimitrov became a bit too daring. Whether Dimitrov suffered physical punishment will never be known. He died in Russia in the summer of 1949 and Stalin stood among the honor guard by his catafalque.

Of all these matters, no word was said at Kostov's trial. On December 14, 1949, he was found guilty on all charges and sentenced to death. The ten other defendants had tearfully inculpated both B 665 664

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[8] Tito's speech at the opening of the Jugoslav National Assembly, April 26, 1950 (*Yugoslav Fortnightly*, Belgrade, May 5, 1950).

[Cf. the account of the negotiation for a Bulgarian-Yugoslav federation, see cat. 116, pp. 205-209--- Analyst]

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surplus may or may not remain to be divided among the peasants. Often, as Kolarov admitted, there is none. The rate at which it would have been divided if it had existed is then only of theoretical interest. There is no space here to indicate the punishments awaiting the peasants who infringe the new statute.[11] Even negligence is defined as "treason to the common good" and punished as—treason. But I must add one item contributed by a Bulgarian friend of mine, for it reveals clearly one of the important intentions of present Communist policy in Bulgaria. In this man's native village the coöperative contains both industrial and agricultural workers. The first group is scrupulously allotted the same number of ration cards as the second. Nothing could be fairer, except that the first group contains 14 persons and the latter about 500. "Recipe for horse and rabbit stew: one horse, one rabbit."

Membership in collectives is "voluntary," but the meaning of this is shown by Prime Minister Chervenkov's description of what is to happen to peasants who do not join. "All tractors and agricultural machines belonging to peasants outside the coöperative farms should be confiscated," he has warned, and in future "only peasants belonging to coöperative farms can use tractors and machines." After this gloss on the 1950 model statute there is no need to go into further details. Peasants who do not have the use of farm machinery cannot fulfill their government quotas, let alone have anything left over to feed themselves and their families. They will "volunteer" or starve.

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We have seen repeatedly that Bulgaria is the satellite where extreme Soviet measures are given their tryout. She was the first to suppress religious freedom and the first to introduce the system of local government by soviets. She was also the first, as already mentioned, to become officially a one-party state, and Dimitrov was the first satellite leader to proclaim the advent of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Russia's reasons for pushing ahead in Bulgaria seem to be two. It is the country where, with the exception of Rumania, her physical domination comes closest to being absolute. But whereas Russians are contemptuous of Rumanians, and are hated in return, they feel close to Bulgarians in race and language and suppose that they will repay past favors by swinging naturally into their allotted

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[11] Details are given in *The Economist*, London, May 27, 1950.

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
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Soviet groove. Secondly, Bulgaria is highly important to Russia 177
strategically. She flanks enemy Jugoslavia. She provides the only
direct approach to Greece since Tito has closed the main route. She 648
adjoins Turkey, on whom the Soviets desire to exert pressure from all directions. She is, as we have seen, Russia's chosen instrument of intervention in the Macedonian question. On every count she is the country which, more directly than any other except Poland, can be useful to Russia in the present line-up of European forces. It is not by chance that she and Poland had the honor of being the first to receive high officers of the Soviet Army as commanders-in-chief of their troops.

The sources of opposition are two[1] One is nationalism. It may be 186
called Titoism or Kostovism, but it is always treason. Nationalists are dealt with as Petkov and Kostov were dealt with. These two, such poles apart, are simply conspicuous examples among tens of thousands who have suffered for opposing the Communization or Sovietization of their country. Any successors they may have, whether noble like Petkov or hateful like Kostov, will be put down with the same irresistible brutality.

The other source of opposition is the peasantry. The peasants re- 565
sist being made into sharecroppers. They do not think that they are 578
being forced into collectives so that a great social goal can be achieved but in order that a group of adventurers can exploit their hold on them and on the country more conveniently. The Communists are everything that peasants hate and fear—the city slicker, the government bureaucrat. These newcomers in the villages, wearing city clothes, often speaking with a foreign accent, urge the peasants to enter collectives for their own good. Those who do are only one degree better off than those who do not—they are allowed to live, while those who refuse starve. But they live as serfs. They will work for the rest of their lives, as they figure it, to support others who will not or cannot work so hard as they must do—other peasants who have let their lands run down and are glad to merge with those who have kept theirs up, and surplus townsfolk who will never learn to "pay their way." That there are other answers to such arguments than force does not matter. The answer has been given, and it is force.

[1] [i.e. Opposition to Sovietization---Analyst]

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selves in the valleys of the Danube, found both troglodyte and surface dwellings in use among the previous inhabitants of these areas, i.e. the Thracians, from whom Roumanians of Vlachia and Moldavia, and Albanians of the Skodra lake area took over these huts, called bordeiu [1].

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More specially the Bulgars, who in their ancient home were living a nomad life, had no permanent houses. They lived just as the rest of Turanian peoples, in tents they put up in places where they could find pastures for their herds; when the pastures were exhausted, camps were dissolved and the tents carried with the nomads.

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When, under the leadership of Asparuch, Bulgars established a strong base in the Delta of the Danube and when, using this stronghold as a base, they occupied all the area between this river and the Balkan mountains, only then began the Bulgars to know the advantages of permanent installation. For a long time, however, they were wild fighters and lived on the peoples they subjugated, the old Thracians, who had been hellenised, or latinised, and the other Greeks and Slavs who had established themselves in those areas during the previous century [2]. These Slavs, according to Procopius [3] and to the Biography of Saint Demetrius [4], knew only how to build [5] «miserable huts» or «tents» besides the underground shelters mentioned above. The thousands of Greek prisoners who were kidnapped during the Bulgarian invasions were «drafted» into the in-

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1) According to **Fr. Nopcsa,** Albanien, 1925, p. 11, these underground dwellings of Roumania and Bulgaria represent the immediate descendants of the pre-historic and Roman housings of the Haimos peninsula. The writings on the tiles found in pre-historic dwellings have a Thracian character. Remains of Thracian tribes have been found despite the Illyric over-layer, both, in the Skodra lake and in Dardania. Dobroutcha has always been a Thracian area.

2) **D. Zakythinos,** Οἱ Σλάβοι ἐν Ἑλλάδι, Athens, 1945, p. 27 «The permanent installation of Slav tribes in the Balkan peninsula begins only during the first years of the 7th Century».

3) **Procop.** De bello Gotth. 3, 14: Οἰκοῦσι δὲ (Σκλαβηνοί τε καὶ Ἄνται) ἐν καλύβαις οἰκτραῖς διεσκηνημένοι πολλῷ μὲν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, ἀμείβοντες δὲ ὡς τὰ πολλὰ τὸν τῆς ἐνοικήσεως ἕκαστοι χῶρον.

4) **A. Tougard,** De l'histoire profane dans les actes grecs des bollandistes. Paris 1874, p. 184, 190.

5) According to **Niederle,** op. cit. 2, p. 98, «it is easily understood that the Slavs used to build, besides the underground shelters (abris) which were covered by an additional wooden roof, light huts without any trenches on the model of the «koliba», built by the shepherds of the Karpathians and the Balkans, made of inter-woven branches of trees».

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vader's country[1] and they were obliged not only to cultivate the land on behalf of their owners, but also to carry out all other work and naturally to build permanent houses which were necessary, since Bulgars were to establish themselves for good in these newly conquered districts.

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For a long time Bulgars had either the disposition nor the sense to learning arts and crafts. Even where they had abandoned their incursions and lootings and were giving themselves to peaceful occupations, as agriculture and stock-breeding, they did not take to the arts. The palaces and the churches of Bulgaria have been built by foreigners, especially by Greeks, such as the beautiful palace of Aboba near Schumen, which is a monument of Byzantine style of the 9th or 10th century[2]. But even later, after the 15th century, when Bulgaria, accord-

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1) The Bulgarian inroads on Greek territories for looting and capture of prisoners began in the period of Asparouch (679-701) and continued till the reign of Michael (1246-1257). King Krum, when he captured Adrianoupolis in 813, took away all her inhabitants, as well as those of the surrounding areas, all amounting to 40.000, into Bulgarian territory to the North of the Danube. Another 50.000 prisoners together with other loot, were taken during the winter of the same year from Thrace (**W. Slatarski,** Geschichte der Bulgaren, I, Leipzig, 1918 p. 15,29). According to the Bulgarian historian **Ivan Sakazov** (Bulgarische Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Berlin u. Leipzig, 1929, p. 57 foll.) «Bulgaria was filled up with prisoners and cattle, which formed the Bulgarian national wealth and made their well-being possible. It was on this basis that the material civilization was formed, which Omortag, Krum's heir, bequeathed to his descendents.» Later (1206), during a battle near the Tountza river, when the Bulgarian Ioannitzis or Skyloyiannis was totally defeated by the Greeks, 20.000 prisoners together with 3.000 carts were liberated, while they were led towards Bulgaria together with a great amount of loot. See **Diog. Xanalatos,** Οἱ Ἕλληνες καὶ οἱ Βούλγαροι εἰς τὴν Μακεδονίαν καὶ Θρᾴκην. Α' Athens 1944 pp. 17, 22 etc. 33, 39, 40 etc. Cp. **K. Paparrigopoulos,** Ἱστορ. Ἑλλ. Ἔθνους 6th edition, tome 4, b, 186 and foll. t. 5, a 23. **K. Amandos,** Ἱστορία τοῦ Βυζαντινοῦ Κράτους Α' 1939 p. 411. Β' 1947, pp 5, 173, 426. Οἱ βόρειοι γείτονες τῆς Ἑλλάδος, 1923 p. 26 and 40 **Ant. Keramopoullos** Οἱ Ἕλληνες καὶ οἱ βόρειοι γείτονες, Athens 1945, p. 167 and foll. **G. A. Megas,** Ἀδριανούπολις ἡ πολυχρουσεμένη in the periodical Ἑλληνικὴ Δημιουργία t. I 1948 pp. 93 and foll.

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2) **L. Niederle,** op. cit. 112. **C. Jirecek** says that: «Even in the best years of the Middle Ages, during the reign of Tsar Symeon, according to the evidence given by Joannis Exarchos, there were to be seen but straw-covered huts in Bulgaria, except for the palace of the king». Straw-covered huts in Bulgaria are also mentioned by Kantakouzinos, 1, 144, edit. Bonn.

According to the Bulgarian historian **I. Sakazov,** op. cit. p. 41, «The very beginnings of an economic organisation in Bulgaria appeared in the court of the Tsars and with the aristocracy, who were trying to imitate the Byzan-

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But even later, after the 15th century, when Bulgaria, according to Zlatev (p. 154) has enjoyed peace and quietness under the strong Turkish authority and when together with economic flourish the building art progressed, especially in the mountainous areas, even then the construction of houses, in Bulgaria and in the rest of Balcan countries was done by foreign, mainly Greek, builders from Western Macedonia and Epirus, the famous «Mastorochoria» (builder's villages)(1).

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We can thus explain the great similarity between the Bulgarian rural, and later urban, house to the Greek house as regards arrangement of spaces external architecture and the methods of building. Consequently, the evolution presented by the Bulgarian house from its simplest original forms to the more composite ones, not only on the former Greek lands (Rodope, Eastern Roumelia, Plate XVI) but also in the districts over the Haimos mountains (Plate XIII-XV) it is the same as that of the Greek house.

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Zlatev knows the builders of Western Macedonia when he says that it is they who introduced the beautiful arched capitals to Western Bulgaria, that sometimes hang freely at the prostoon of the houses. But Zlatev sees in these a mark of the «Italian Rennaissance» which «the Macedonians transferred from the eastern shores of the Adriatic (!) to Western Bulgaria» (p. 155). This Italian Rennaissance, according to the Bulgarian architect, «was also transplanted in the house building of Eastern Bulgaria, yet through another route, namely through Constantinople and Adrianople, and the Aegean coasts, where it took a Byzantine influence»! That is to say, Zlatev does recognize

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tine court in everything. There were many foreign prisoners in the Bulgarian capital who were specialists in various arts, as well as free Byzantine master-technicians, even during the periods when the relations of Bulgaria with Byzantion were peaceful. We can safely say that the first teachers of the Bulgarians on art, crafts and handicrafts were foreigners. Everything which the court or the aristocrats needed, was made by these artisans». The fact that Greek craftsmen were teachers of the Bulgarians in building churches and houses, and that Byzantion sent craftsmen, builders, painters etc. into Bulgaria, may be seen in **I. Sakazov**, op. cit. pp. 46, 59, 78.

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1) On a total of twenty ancient tombs excavated in W. Macedonia by A. Keramopoullos, four contained, among other offerings, the tools of the dead (Minutes of Arch. Society, 1934, p. 77, 79, 80). It can be thus said that the craft of house-builder has been handed from father to son in that area for at least 2.000 years. (See **Ant. Keramopoullos**, Τί εἶναι οἱ Κουτσόβλαχοι Athens 1939, p. 56). About Epirote craftsmen see **Ang. Hadjimichali**, Ἠπειρωτικὴ λαϊκὴ τέχνη. Ἠπειρωτικὰ Χρονικά Ε' 1930 p. foll and «La maison grecque» in L'Hellénisme Contemporain, Ser. II, 3 (1949) pp. 250 foll.

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[For a discussion of the nature, scope and probable future trends (up to 1970) of Soviet economic relations with the East European satellites since World War II, and the degree of inter-satellite economic integration, see 60: Bergson, R1 Soviet Union, category 116, pp. 321-355]

113, 668, 648 Bulgaria EE1

[For a discussion of Bulgarian political activities in Macedonia in 1911, and Serb-Bulgar relations concerning the Macedonian question, see E16 Slavic Peoples, 1: Niederle, category 116, pp. 131-134]

113, 648, 167 Bulgaria EE1

[For a brief statement of the status and territorial organization of the Bulgarian minority in the Soviet Ukraine and its relationship with the Communist Party of Bulgaria prior to the establishment of the Bulgarian People's Republic, see 21: Kolarz, R1 Soviet Union, category 116, p. 147.]

648, 665, 642, 433 Bulgaria EE1

[For the economic and political position of Bulgaria under Soviet control since the death of Stalin, see 85: Zinner, R1 Soviet Union, category 116, Pp. 157B-163B.]